
Khoi Nguyen: As you state in your introduction, your starting point was the relations between employed staff and volunteers in refugee support, and it was observations in the field that drew your attention to what I see now as a more central component of your book, the languaged subject and specifically the languaged worker. We’re talking about how people are evaluated and evaluate themselves according to their linguistic repertoires, conceptualised as linguistic resources at work. I think the concept of the languaged subject has wide reaching implications in contemporary Europe and beyond. How would you explain the significance of being languaged in Austria and in Europe, or more generally today? And what other areas do you see where this form of subjectivation is particularly consequential?
Jonas Hassemer: Takes on language have assumed an immensely prominent role in discourses around migration in Austria and across Europe, it’s heavily politicised. I am thinking about aggressive language testing regimes and restrictive language policies but also discourses on the value of linguistic diversity. We see it in discussions around what is viewed as integration, mainly, and Austria has adopted very early, very rigorous political measures for migrants coming to Austria regarding language that connect questions of language learning to social benefits and legal rights. In my book I wanted to look at people who work with languages in various ways, not all of them for money (as counsellors, interpreters, volunteers) in a field that is decidedly critical of the restrictive political climate.
Khoi Nguyen: Because you focus on counsellors rather than the people that seek services, I think it’s striking that being languaged is also a way in which people achieve agency in the institutions, right?
Jonas Hassemer: One achieves agency within a certain frame. Processes that institute difference between people also materialise such frames. There is no agency if there’s no material from which it can be formed – the constraints are constitutive for agency, but structure is also something that needs to be produced and reproduced. In the book, I’m trying to understand how people navigate the constraints they find themselves in. And they manage to achieve quite something – they fight unjust evictions, fraud on the housing market, mediate in conflicts, organise furniture – but they are always implicated in differences and inequalities, which we see in the languaging, but also in responsibilising logics that gain traction in some decision-making processes. I think of agency as always contaminated. A prime example of this were those counsellors on the team who could speak Arabic (Chapter 6): highly esteemed by the team but also confronted with multiple and sometimes conflicting expectations by colleagues and clients. These expectations are tied to language, but also to gendered and racialised positions. And in the book, we encounter individuals who make this work very well for themselves and others less so.
Khoi Nguyen: I think the racialised component is visible in your book, where a lot of interactions have nothing, primarily, to do with passports or alike, but with the body from both sides, how people come to embody things, but also how they are being perceived. Speaking of embodied experience, I want to single out something on the verge between methodology and theoretical insight. You and Mi-Cha Flubacher have also written about this outside of the book. Could you talk a bit more about what precarious ethnography means and what maybe distinguishes it from more general ideas of researcher positionality and reflexivity?
Jonas: With precarious ethnography, we wanted to talk about positionality and reflexivity in a way that embraces discomforting experiences in fieldwork as sources of knowledge. I suppose discomfort is a very common experience for ethnographers and for researchers in general, but it’s not something encountered very often as part of the analytical framework. What Mi-Cha and I found interesting was that we experienced our positionalities during fieldwork as something that needed to be managed in certain situations, and we wanted to look at this as something systematic. It’s not random that I have, for instance, to think about coming out or not in the specific context I am doing research in, but also about the way I think about myself as a speaker of German in that context. With this idea of precarious ethnography, we wanted to look not only at questions of positionality as something that gives a certain perspective on the research object (and definitely not in the sense of bias or privileged access). The idea of being transparent of one’s perspective is of course important part of researcher reflexivity. But we also like to think that this perspective, which for instance I can assume vis-à-vis a specific research object does not only depend on me: Where do I fit in within that specific context that I’m doing research in? Trying to locate the position or the different positions that I’m able to take within that space would reveal something about that space. So it’s about how our positionality is articulated in co-dependence with other participants in the field and then connect this to more systemic differences and inequalities in motility, in access to resources, in wiggle room that subjects have within that space.
Khoi Nguyen: We will return to precariousness/precarity because it’s a bigger part of your general argument, but first, I’d like to ask you about Chapter 4, on the Emergency List. There is a significant exploration of morality, particularly in an institutional context of power and existential stakes. For context, it is about which clients receive again limited resources, namely emergency apartments. The people making these decisions, obviously – this is an NGO – they’re not being cruel. They’re trying to morally navigate this situation. I would be curious about what thoughts you have on reflexivity, not just in terms of research ethics, but as an ethical practice more in general.
Jonas Hassemer: Maybe I need to go back to why I was interested in reflexivity in the first place. When I started doing research in that organisation, I was fascinated by the very elaborated thoughts people working there had about current politics, about their own work, while at the same time being able to take very difficult decisions which I would personally see as dilemmatic. This was puzzling to me because I had thought about reflexivity as leading to a place where you are very cautious about giving definite answers to problems, because you can always see the downside to things (and I tend to see this as somehow typical of the sociolinguist’s professional habitus). I wanted to figure out how people did not end in aporia when facing moral or political dilemmas, while being reflexively aware of the complexities and power dynamics involved. I’m interested in this also because I think it’s an important part of doing critical sociolinguistics. The knowledge we produce should allow (us or others) some kind of political evaluation of what is going on, to draw conclusions from what we observe and from the kinds of analysis that we’re doing. Hence my interest in reflexivity as an ethical practice, as a sort of meta-reflexivity. I explore this from different angles: In relation to the emergency list, I look at how certain ideas of reflexivity emerge in a specific interactional context, how they develop across various interactions and how the idea of an ethical subjectivity becomes connected to these models of reflexivity in practice. At a later point (Chapter 5), I look at different ways of embodying a reflexive Self, and then into how practices of reflexivity are being institutionalised in the NGO, and how pathways of institutionalisation also lead to differential access to reflexivity as a resource for different actors in the NGO (Chapter 9).
Khoi Nguyen: To explore that further, I want to pick up an aspect from Chapter 5 Being a ‘Good’ Counsellor. You begin that chapter with a field note that describes Sara’s [the manager’s] professionalism in terms of affect. Conceptually you draw on various sources, but I’m thinking about it in terms of Wetherell’s idea of affective practice, as a social practice linked to Sara’s habitus and the practical mastery of her display of emotions and behaviour towards the emotions of others. It reminded me of Wetherell’s discussion of the notion of emotional capital with respect to effective affective practices. Sometimes the institutionally advantageous affective practice is sarcasm and joking, and other times it is restraint, and sometimes it’s a display of empathy. It depends highly on race, gender, and other embodied biographical elements which affective practices are legitimate or effective in any given situation. Do you think there is a way to usefully talk about your observations in terms of capital, affective or otherwise?
Jonas Hassemer: First, I think we need to differentiate: capital for whom? To feel, like some of the counsellors I encountered, an embodied connection with their client based on a shared experience of language or racialisation, was seen as a resource by some, but it could also be the opposite. At least partly, it is a question of whether that kind of embodied affect smoothly blends into institutional order, whether it helps to grease the machinery, so to speak. Then it becomes an emotional capital in the workplace, it’s something that people are valued for in the team, but to what extent they can themselves profit from it, is yet another question. However, if it contradicts the institutional will, it can become a (often well meant) concern for the team and the individual as well. When the institutional order is threatened, embodied affect becomes problematised very quickly. Then, it becomes difficult to reformulate it as a resource, even if the actors themselves understand it that way.
Khoi Nguyen: You pick up affect as a way of understanding how the NGO workers balance the usefulness and the neediness of volunteer interpreters as a sort of moral practice again. I feel like there’s a lot of interplay between empathy and compassion on the one hand and affect and affective management on the other hand. Do you think, besides just affective stance taking to embody morality, there is such a thing as affective ethics, drawn on precarity?
Jonas Hassemer:: Practicing some sort of affective ethics is an important part of all kinds of professional work that is connected to helping and supporting people. It has so many facets: Why do you keep working in an underpaid job with a constant lack of resources? A job which often requires a lot of patience with both people and structures? There’s also the dimension of excessive compassion, unmanageable affect which not only paralyzes you, but it also occludes the possibility to use compassion in a measured and goal-oriented way. A chapter in Miriam Ticktin’s Casualties of Care inspired me a lot where she writes about how compassion is something that health professionals need to be socialised into. I see this with both the counsellors and the interpreters in my NGO context. But there is a huge difference between volunteers and counsellors. Counsellors can extensively draw on institutionalised practices and structures that allow them to process affect, the staff meetings, supervision. Most of them also have had professional training in a relevant field, while with the interpreters the situation is very heterogeneous. They can also take supervision, but the structures at their disposition are much less encompassing.
Khoi Nguyen: I wanted to give you more space to discuss a point that you raise in the discussion, namely how even very socially oriented, empathetically motivated work cannot quite be disentangled from the inequalities in which the work occurs. I want to broaden this out to the context in which the two of us find ourselves, and which may ring true for social researchers in general who might be reading this blog. How do we navigate and resist politics of difference while our subjectivities are inextricably intertwined with the same politics of difference? It’s becoming more relevant, I think, these days.
Jonas Hassemer:: Yes, definitely. It’s a huge question. I think what I did in the book, to start with this perhaps, is that I tried not to assume a bird’s eye perspective, in the sense that I’m going to tell these people what good reflexivity looks like, and where this should lead. I think there is a lot ethnographic research can offer: looking at how differences are constructed, pointing out where inequalities creep into the practices we’re implicated in, and studying ways of living together across differences. Not so much as (lived) utopia, but as a social space which people happen to share and need to work on to create liveable conditions for each other. NGOs can be places where this happens. To me, that’s a promising way of thinking about social critique. If, with Foucault, critique is something that is historically contextualised, it’s not something that comes from a bird’s eye position. It can help to navigate inequalities and try to find ways of at least partially resisting them. And I think that is promising, especially in times where the political landscape looks gloomy.








