Karen Mary Davalos: Visualizing Latinx could not be more timely, although I can imagine some readers thinking about the creative arts as esoteric in this current moment. As the federal government and some states are devastating Latinx families, communities, and institutions, why does this book matter?
Arlene Dávila: All this hatred we are seeing comes from the historic dehumanization of Latinx communities. So many anthropologists—from Leo Chavez and Otto Santa Ana to so many others—have documented how, for decades, this country has been unable to imagine and visualize Latinx people outside of very limited tropes: the criminal or the undocumented migrant, or the consumer or else as a homogenous political bloc. These tropes have historically pathologized our community, making it impossible for us to see or imagine Latinx agency, to think about Latinx artists, and to view Latinx people with the multidimensionality that is needed.
So, for sure, a book like this is vital in expanding the conversation, providing nuance, and humanizing Latinx people as fashion designers, filmmakers, artists, and creative human beings who are actively imagining better worlds. This is necessary not only to challenge these old tired dominant narratives but also to achieve a fuller understanding of these creative fields!
Additionally, we are seeing an incredible attack on archives and all kinds of research, and we’re witnessing how vulnerable the digital realm has become. This is something you have also written about in your generative Dialogues on digital humanities for Latin American and Latinx Visual Culture. As digital programs, projects, and initiatives can be so easily dismissed with the touch of a button, erasing decades of research, we need more documentation, more research, more writing! This is yet another reason why a physical book that creates lasting documentation of the creative work of the Latinx community is so important.
Karen Mary Davalos: One of the values of Visualizing Latinx is your methodological insistence. You document and elevate the filmmakers’, the designers’, the public artists’ and the South Texas artists’ “own terms” for creativity and success. Can you discuss the implications of “their own terms” for filmmakers and fashion designers and other artists?
Arlene Dávila: We have been making this shift for decades, as those who have come of age in the U.S. have had the unique opportunity to observe. Having witnessed changing racial ideologies, evolving social movements, and shifting attitudes toward race and Latino identity, we can truly appreciate this moment—and it is exactly what I most wanted to highlight in the book.
The racism we grew up with structuralized a pressure to mainstream, to fit into dominant canons, and to shape our image to please the dominant eye. We see this play out in the art world through tendencies that historically embraced whitewashed definitions and downplayed vernacular, rasquache aesthetics. In fashion, it often meant ignoring the everyday, popular culture that contemporary designers like Luar and Willy Chavarria now boldly center.
Ultimately, I wanted to write this book to highlight how exciting it is that new generations of artists and creators working in visual culture industries–from fashion to independent filmmaking and public art–are no longer creating in reference to a dominant culture. Instead, they are drawing from vernacular culture, popular traditions, and their own family histories—and doing so with incredible pride, ingenuity, and enthusiasm. We have always had examples of artists making these kinds of bold statements in their work. However, seeing this approach cross over into the mainstream—and witnessing artists achieve greater recognition of work that is deeply informed by personal and vernacular references—is a new development that is worth highlighting as proof to younger generations that it is entirely possible to gain wide visibility while producing work that remains true to our communities, our histories, our creativity. To me, this represents a deeply exciting, empowering development that signals how art can be so powerful in embodying new anti-racist projects within our communities.
Karen Mary Davalos: Visualizing Latinxis an important argument for paying attention, seeing, and valuing Latinx filmmakers, designers, public artists and creatives in South Texas, a region largely overlooked in Chicana/o/x art history. I see this book as building a discourse for visibility and your work at The Latinx Project at New York University as the infrastructure for that visibility. Can you talk about why you wanted to include TLP in this book?
Arlene Dávila: I decided to write a chapter about The Latinx Project at NYU to highlight the importance of creating institutions and structures for validating, archiving, and documenting Latinx culture, history and art in all its generous forms and expressions. The lack of infrastructure to learn about independent film, the scarcity of university courses teaching about our artists, and the near-total absence of archives and collections focusing on Latinx design were all findings that made one thing clear: we need dedicated, specialized archives, databases, and research collections to address this profound void. There is still so much work to be done. We cannot simply ask, ‘How is it possible that we don’t know about Latinx art?’ when it is completely missing from the canon of most traditional disciplines, our curricula, and our syllabi. This underscores how vital it is to have dedicated spaces to nurture this research, especially in the political and cultural climate we are living in today.
In particular, the book was inspired by the work of so many individuals and groups who are actively building these archives, support networks, and collections to combat this lack of documentation. In South Texas, in particular, I found so many exciting projects dedicated to recovering history and changing the dominant script—a script that seeks to marginalize this community and present it as devoid of value and history. Ultimately, we are at a moment where we must all pay close attention to the alternative ways our communities are fighting back. By documenting these histories, we are ensuring that future generations can recognize there is a rich history that can advance the conversation. Ultimately that’s what so many Latinx scholars have historically done – your own work on Chicana artists and Mexican American art included- and why Latinx Studies and ethnic studies is so vital more than ever. At a moment when we see so many attacks on these fields, I hope readers will learn what a massive difference an initiative like The Latinx Project can make—and how little it takes to make an impact when there are so many voids left to fill in the field. In particular, this chapter highlights the importance of collaborative and interdisciplinary work. I know these are issues your own research and practice evoke so beautifully, which is why I was so happy to be in conversation with you, and why I am so excited about the brilliant work being produced by contemporary scholars working at the intersection of Latinx studies and anthropology.
Adam Jaworski: Why is it useful to conceptually distinguish between elite language workers (Thurlow’s 2020 “wordsmiths”) and low-salaried ones, despite your claim in the final chapter that all language workers, no matter how privileged or not, are subject to neoliberal precarity?
Gwynne Mapes: Foundational scholarship on language work in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology focused entirely on contexts which were markedly low-paying and low status. Cameron’s (2000) study on call center workers in the UK, for example, demonstrates the exploitation of workers’ linguistic labor, while others explore similar processes unfolding in multilingual contexts (for example, Heller 2003). Relatedly, recent work in applied linguistics documents the precarious working contexts of irregular employment (for example, Park 2022) and online teaching (such as Curran and Jenks 2023). Thurlow’s (2020) turn to more high-end examples of linguistic labor and thus represents an important step for understanding a different dimension of people’s working lives and language. Wordsmiths are not only well-remunerated, but their work is also prestigious, and thus laden with symbolic (social, cultural) capital. That said, throughout my research on speechwriters I was mindful of Duchêne’s (2020) concern that our scholarly labeling of these hierarchies in language work must not be approached uncritically. While I did not set out to draw a specific parallel between the various precarities experienced by lower-status language workers and high-status speechwriters, I think the book neatly exposes how the structures of neoliberal capitalism necessarily foster exploitation and inequality across a wider range of contexts than we might expect.
In the final chapter of The Language Work of Speechwriters, I discuss elite precarity. This phrase is meant to capture how those who benefit from the material privileges of capitalism are still subject to the rather damning effects of commodification. In other words, just as a call center worker is alienated from the products of their labor and estranged from their peers, so too are speechwriters, and other high-end language workers like academics, for that matter (see Chun 2022: 26-27). However, I don’t wish to downplay the differences between a person who struggles to feed their children or pay their bills, and someone whose metadiscursive reflections reveal the impacts of competitive (dis)empowerment. The degree to which lower-salaried workers experience inequality and suffering is certainly a world apart from the exploitation of speechwriters. But my point is that all this reflects the ultimate failure of the free market – while capitalism sells individual prosperity and meritocratic achievement, even its most successful workers are reduced to “bundles of skills” (see Gershon 2011) whose personal worth is alarmingly blurred with their market value. Ultimately, neoliberal capitalism breeds discontent across the full hierarchy of language workers.
Adam Jaworski: Your book can be considered a genre analysis of political speechwriters’ professional discourse oscillating around three keywords: invisibility, craft, and virtue. What are the profession’s dominant or distinguishing language ideologies and emblematic (meta)discourses?
Gwynne Mapes: I use invisibility, craft, and virtue to describe the primary rhetorical strategies speechwriters orient to when describing their work, but importantly, these motifs also crop up in speechwriting texts (such as archives and drafts) and education materials (such as courses and textbooks), as well as in their naturally-occurring talk (that is, a virtual happy hour meeting). While invisibility, craft, and virtue serve as thematic categories to structure the book, I ultimately argue that they are key for establishing value, representing ideological positionings which are avowed and disavowed strategically in the service of status production.
Invisibility is rooted in the classic tension which speechwriters must always manage in their work – they are the authors, but never the animators nor necessarily principals of their labor (see Goffman 1981 on “production format”). This unique professional context demands their self-erasure, which speechwriters routinely reclaim as a point of professional pride and skill. Their ability to remain backstage and disappear behind the façade of the speaker not only signifies an admirable sense of humility; it is also an act of power, and key for establishing their overall success and advancement in the profession.
Likewise, speechwriters’ particular craft is rooted in their role as exceptional creatives. On the one hand, this entails a metadiscursive orientation towards poetics – speechwriters see their writing as beautiful and refined. On the other, their expertise relies on skillful language use (for example, an ability to distill difficult material) as well as persuasion (such as constructing a compelling story). Their work is thus complicatedly caught between rhetorical responsibilities and the principles of artistry – skills which are wielded for claiming professional and personal worth. Following Thurlow (2012), speechwriters’ markedly creative labor thus guarantees their status vis-à-vis other kinds of more undervalued language workers.
Lastly, virtue, or behavior deemed especially ethical or moral in the context of speechwriting, serves as a “moral meaning-making” strategy for practitioners (Montiegel 2021). This was showcased by one speechwriter’s use of the phrase “quiet power” to describe his work: speechwriters may receive no public credit, but their linguistic labor is uniquely positioned to influence. In other words, the cultural indexicalities associated with so-called impact mark speechwriters’ work as especially beneficial – both politically and socially. Here, micro-linguistic details (such as word choice and prosodic cues) assist speechwriters in actively moralizing their profession amidst the complicated task of asserting their own status and prestige.
What comes to the fore is how invisibility, craft, and virtue serve as discursive resources for engaging in the status competition characteristic of contemporary capitalism. Speechwriting discourse of all kinds articulates practitioners’ real value in terms relevant to the commodification of knowledge and linguistic skill.
Adam Jaworski: I was particularly taken by your approach to the redacted archives of speech drafts by President George W. Bush, housed at the George W. Bush Library and Museum in Dallas, Texas (Chapter 3). In your analysis, you – of necessity – relied on what Genette (1997) calls “paratexts”. Are paratexts an underappreciated and understudied genre in sociolinguistics?
Gwynne Mapes: The story which precedes Chapter 3 is this: I attempted to gain access to speech production materials through the archives of George W. Bush, which were the most recent presidential records available to the public. I was helped by various library staff members in my selection of materials from the archive website. As I was primarily interested in seeing how final, delivered speeches differ from the initial writing produced by the speechwriting team, I chose an archival box that was described as containing speech drafts. However, when I received the files by email, nearly all the speech production texts were redacted. In their place I found official lists of items that had been removed (for example, “Labor Day Remarks [Draft 2]”), along with the specific reason for redaction according to the Presidential Records Act. In most cases the coded restriction was labeled P5: “release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors”. In other words, speech drafts qualify as presidential counsel, and were therefore prohibited from public view. These lists, as paratexts, thus effectively ensure that the speaker (George W. Bush) retains all rights to ownership of his speeches, despite the existing record of their being authored by various others.
Genette’s (1997) literary terminology is new to me, but I do find it useful here for conceptualizing the more secondary pieces of discourse which surround a primary text, and which thereby guide readers toward specific interpretations. In this sense, paratexts are integral to a holistic understanding of the language context – and yes, for this reason I believe they are probably understudied in sociolinguistics. For example, what one gains from analyzing the material redaction of speechwriters’ linguistic labor from public record is a more accurate understanding of their discursive orientations to invisibility and erasure; the paratext provides important ethnographic insight into these processes. Linguistic anthropologist Jillian Cavanaugh has advocated this sort of approach, as well (2017). For example, her work concerning Bergamasco salami production outlines the various documentary regimes which collectively attribute value to certain practices (and linguistic-cum-material objects) while also ensuring neoliberal worker surveillance. All of this is to say that what we traditionally understand as language in use is often scaffolded by these more peripheral texts which are nonetheless integral for understanding the social role of discourse.
Adam Jaworski: It could be argued that speechwriters act as ventriloquists remotely manipulating their so-called dummies (speakers) in acts of performance (that is, while giving political speeches). Would it be useful for Bakhtin’s concept of ventriloquism to be part of your analytic toolbox?
Gwynne Mapes: Bakhtin’s (1984) conceptualization of texts as dialogic and multivoiced is important for a general understanding of all socially-situated language, I think, and you are right that it is especially fitting for thinking about the material products of speechwriters’ language work. Public speeches are indeed a perfect example of how a multiplicity of voices come to be rather complicatedly tangled together. It is not simply a matter of author (that is, the speechwriter), animator (that is, the speaker), and principal (that is, the larger institution, such as a political party) – rather a whole host of people contribute to the production of a speech, including additional staff members, legal consultants, policy experts, and even historical figures via quoted material. In this sense, the public performance of a speech is intricately polyphonous from its very conception.
However, I find ventriloquism to be less clear in terms of its applicability to the speechwriting context, because of its association with a lack of emotional investment on the part of the speaker. While there were many moments in my fieldwork when speechwriters referred favorably to seeing their own beliefs or political positions come through in speeches, not everything they write is wholly representative of their personal experiences and opinions. A public speech is certainly a performative act, but ideally it is one which captures the authentic voice, character, and genuine intent of the speaker over all else.
References
Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1984. Problemsof Dostoevsky’s Poetics; ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Cameron, Deborah. 2000. “Styling the Worker: Gender and the Commodification of Language in the Globalized Service Economy.” Journal of Sociolinguistics 4(3): 323-347.
Cavanaugh, Jillian R. 2017. “How the Sausage Gets Made: Food safety and the mediality of talk, documents, and food practices.” In Jillian R. Cavanaugh and Shalini Shankar (eds.) Language and Materiality: Ethnographical and theoretical explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.105-124.
Chun, Christian W. 2022. A World without Capitalism: Alternative discourses, spaces, and imaginaries. London: Routledge.
Curran, Nathaniel Ming and Christopher Jenks. 2023. “Gig Economy Teaching: On the importance and dangers of self-branding in online markets.” Applied Linguistics 44(3): 442-461.
Duchêne, Alexandre. 2020. “Unequal Language Work(ers) in the Business of Words.” In Crispin Thurlow (ed.) TheBusiness of Words: Wordsmiths, linguists, and other language workers. New York: Routledge. 23-35.
Genette, Gérard. 1997. Paratexts: Thresholds of interpretation; trans. Jane E. Lewin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gershon, Ilana. 2011. “Neoliberal Agency.” Current Anthropology 52(4): 537–555.
Goffman, Erving. 1981. Forms of talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Heller, Monica. 2003. “Globalization, the New Economy, and the Commodification of Language and Identity.” Journal of Sociolinguistics 7(4): 473-492.
Montiegel, Kristella. 2021. “Use Your Words”: Vocalization and Moral Order in an Oral Preschool Classroom for Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing Children.” Language in Society 52 (1): 107-127.
Park, Joseph Sung-Yal. 2022. The Perceiving Subject of Irregular Employment: Applied linguistics, precarity, and capitalism. In Christian W. Chun (ed.) Applied linguistics and politics. London: Bloomsbury. 109-129.
Thurlow, Crispin. 2012. Determined Creativity: Language play in new media. In Rodney H. Jones (ed.) Discourse and creativity. London: Pearson. 169-210.
Thurlow, Crispin, ed. 2020. The Business of Words: Wordsmiths, linguists, and other language workers. New York: Routledge.
Aditi Surie: Experimental Times: Startup Capitalism and Feminist Futures in India (University of California Press 2025) is a compelling and contemporary story and articulation of what is happening in the economy around us, and I’ve had a delicious last few days with this book. Reading the book has made me pause and reflect because you’re not only writing about the city of Bangalore that I live in, but also about how the economy is shifting under our feet very quickly. This book is for anyone who has encountered startup thinking in their day-to-day lives. That is to say, if you’ve ever gotten the message to do what you love, to learn how to experiment at work, to stay up to date, to stay agile, or to think about how to change the world around us through business, to refashion yourself to become part of the culture around you: this is the kind of story that the book tells, and the book is an anthropological unpacking of what happens when business and organizational forms are agile, shifting and experimental.
The book could have very well just been about technology and the startup economy, but it’s not. Instead, it unpacks what it is to be part of startup capitalism, which is an anchoring thread that you offer us, so this book is about what the technology economy has done to Bangalore over the decades, but specifically about this moment of startup capitalism and the kind of cultural production it requires us to be part of.
Maybe you can start, for those who haven’t read the book, by helping us understand some of the fundamental arguments you’re putting forth in the book? This comes through in the structure itself: the first part centred around the key figure of the entrepreneur and how he is produced, and the second exploring how his visions shape everyday worlds of work. Can you tell us who the main figures are in the book, and your approach to studying start up capitalism? Why did you choose to study management and employees?
Hemangini Gupta: Thank you, Aditi. I think the way you set the book up is fantastic! The cover art is by London-based artist Shehzad Dawood, and it is a tapestry piece that’s called Ambiguous Relationships. The reason that I mention this is because I think that many of the relationships that people in the book have with the startup economy and with entrepreneurship are really ambiguous. There’s pleasure, there are friendships, there are job cuts, there is precarity, and so there’s really a shifting structure of feeling towards this form of capitalism in answer to your question.
The first part of the book looks at Bangalore’s transformations into an aspiring startup city from a center of backend software work and the call centers that it was known for in the 1990s. It draws on fieldwork at different accelerator labs, incubation centers, and small entrepreneurial companies. I show the production of the entrepreneur as a hyper visible figure to understand who this figure is, and how this figure is not just about his products and his innovations, but also about caste and access to networks, gender, class, and how these forms of identity and advantage come together to shape value in this new economy. Entrepreneurs were very keen to tell me that their work is not the work of “cyber coolies”, they don’t do “backend work”, they’re not doing projects that have been sent to them from the Global North. They emphasized that they were inventing and innovating from here in Bangalore, and I understood that as a particular kind of postcolonial remaking of one’s place and one’s work to situate oneself differently in the world. The book makes the argument that startup capitalism is also a remaking of a city and urban spaces, and a particular coming together of race and caste and class and gender to form value. So, even as I was hearing around me, “it doesn’t matter what your gender is, it doesn’t matter what your caste is”, I was finding that these things were in fact very important in producing value. So that’s the first part of the book. It looks at how startup capitalism is fabricated through racial constructions of the human, through how caste and class ideas of risk circulated and are funded, and how elite entrepreneurial masculinity is built through circulation across time and space in the city.
As I finished this fieldwork, I became interested in what happens after an entrepreneurial company is formed. Someone has a fantastic idea, they get funded, they start a company, then what? How does that company scale? How does it grow? Who is employed there? The second half of the book —The Entrepreneurial Everyday— is based on ethnographic fieldwork in a company that I call Captivate Travels. From the vantage point of being an ethnographer at work here (known as a “Marketing intern”) I asked: what is the everyday work of life under startup capitalism like? The people employed here were mostly young women, and many of them had moved to the city for work.
The second half of the book draws on my experiences working alongside them to explore how we might craft feminist futures within this world of startup entrepreneurship. The company underwent a lot of technological restructuring, and about 30% of workers lost their jobs. So I was able to witness what happens when people who are very invested in this idea of the company family lose their jobs and don’t have any control over the conditions of their work. Even as employees traffic in this idea that we’re a part of the same family, or you can bring your good ideas to work to be implemented, they don’t own company shares, they don’t really make decisions at the managerial level. So, studying people at different rungs of the economy gives you some situated lenses into how this dream that startup capitalism can provide social good for everyone really unfolds across different sectors of the economy.
Aditi Surie: You describe your approach as “labor as method,” and draw from feminist ethnography to center bodies, feelings, and infrastructures. This methodological stance is key to the book’s intervention. Can you walk us through how this approach shaped your fieldwork? What kinds of spaces, conversations, and relationships did it open up?
Hemangini Gupta: There were dense concentrations of startup work and entrepreneurship in particular parts of the city of Bangalore where this book is based that we would call startup hubs, so I came up with “labor as method” as a way to approach the field work. I lived with an entrepreneur when I was doing field work, and I call her Naina in the book, and discovered from Naina’s life that when you study startup entrepreneurship, you don’t study it at a particular site. There’s no single office that I could go to. So, Naina would wake up early in the morning, she’d go for a run to Cubbon Park, then she’d meet people in the morning for coffee, she’d go to different meetings, coffee outings with clients, and then evening drinks with someone who was also potentially a client or a collaborator. Startup capitalism is threaded through the sites and streets of the city, and so I wondered: how, as an anthropologist, would I be able to study this? How do you study forms of labor that are not always explicit? Labor as method is an invitation to track the different sites where value is produced, because it also helps you see who’s being left out so to interview women creating their businesses at the fringes of the city and witnessing what they understood as networking downstairs in the apartment building while their children were playing was also a reminder of how reproductive labor shapes the production of value and the possibilities for entrepreneurial success. Witnessing women struggle with the late-night networking and calls of the startup world or the expectation that they would be continually on and available was a reminder of how labor is sometimes hyper invisibilized and at other times invisibilized. Labor as method helps me work through these disparate and variegated worlds that comprise startup capitalism.
Aditi Surie: This also takes us back to another compelling word of our time, when it comes to the relationship between technology and work in the contemporary age, which is flexibility. This is a term that is academically really important, and politically also important, because in this moment we are told that flexible jobs are good because it brings women into the workforce. Entrepreneurship creates flexibility for time, but in the book you talk about flexibility quite frankly. The bodily subjectivity of an entrepreneur requires a different kind of flexibility from that which is promised to the workers. Can you help us understand what you mean by flexibility in the time politics that you see in startup capitalism? I study the gig economy, and flexibility is constantly mentioned as part of a narrative of why gig jobs are good compared to formal jobs. Formal jobs, where you have very particular working conditions, where you work from nine to five, you know when your day is going to end, you know when the day begins, and there’s routinization of work that has been seen as an ideal, so can you help us understand how startup capitalism breaks that down?
Hemangini Gupta: I found the promise of flexibility to be so misleading, because women were able to be flexible, but what was happening was that their work was just doubling and tripling. They were expected to do so much more under the guise of flexibility. One of the chapters of my book tracks a few entrepreneurs through a day in their lives and this chapter illuminates the limits of the discourse of flexibility under startup capitalism by showing how it plays out. My example is an entrepreneur whom I call Ruhanna, who lives in a small two-bedroom apartment in a massive gated complex over an hour away from the city’s startup hubs.
I’m in her house interviewing her, because she doesn’t have time to meet me elsewhere. I pull out my recorder and began talking to her in between her infant baby’s gurgling and occasional high-pitched wails. This is the flip side of flexibility: that she’s working in her house with her children. Just as I asked my first question, the doorbell rang, and her older son returned from school. Our interview had barely begun but it was already constantly punctuated by different things happening. After it finished, I ended up taking her son and his friends to the library, just opposite, because she needed some time with the baby. This interview and exchange gave me a material sense of how this promise of flexibility for women, that they could do entrepreneurial businesses on their own time, was lived in reality because of the amount of reproductive labor they were also doing that was not being subsidized or taken away from them.
At the company where I did fieldwork, the founder said to me, “I hate this idea that when you go to work, you have to swipe in and out. Here, you work when you can, and you leave when you need to!” I was quite interested in how it would actually work at the office, and I found that for some of the women who’d been employed at that company for longer periods of time, they were having actual physical breakdowns, because they were working at work, and then they were working when they got home. One of them said to me that she had injured her wrist so she just propped herself up in bed, placed her laptop on her lap, and called a friend who made notes for her. Flexibility allowed work to seep into all kinds of spaces that in an earlier economy might have just ended when you got home. I found this, especially in the case of women, to be very pronounced in terms of them beginning to embody work in a way that led to actual physical breakdowns, and required them to extend work in unimaginable ways, because the imagined figure of flexibility is the entrepreneurial man who doesn’t have the same commitments or care work.
Aditi Surie: For women employees in an entrepreneurial firm, even though they are not the entrepreneurs we think about, they are very much driven by the same opportunistic idea that just by working hard they can get what they need. Yet they are met by structural barriers, and we see that in the case of the women in your story, that reproductive work and other factors play into that. They might have had solidarity and friendship at the workplace, where they were able to muddle through it together, but with the automation of jobs, what happens then to the entrepreneurial mindset? What have these women’s lives looked like after those job losses, and what kind of message do we take away? Because I think all of us are now implicated in some of these forces, not just the women in your story.
Hemangini Gupta: When I first began fieldwork there was so much interest and commitment in the small Indian entrepreneurial company with the feeling that it could do things differently. There was none of the stigma that’s sometimes associated with call center work, instead there is a sort of respectability and a professionalism attached to entrepreneurial companies, and the feeling that if you have an idea for a new project, well, it’s all yours, you can do it. You don’t get extra money for it, you’re not rewarded materially, but it’s the sense that you’re building something. That’s a very compelling fiction. Women workers were really compelled by the idea that you can build the company family. In response to the job losses the idea of the company family also shaped how they responded, which was in personal terms, through a sense that particular members of the management let workers down.
The last chapter follows some of these women to ask, so where did they go after the job losses? What are they doing now? Where are they employed? Many of the young women got married and moved to where their husbands got work, and they don’t work right now because of racialized borders and their visa rules and regimens. Several of them are taking care of their kids, and performing other forms of labor. So, I made with Shreya K., a filmmaker, a series of short video essays with many of these women, tracking them during COVID and after they’d left the company to experiment with the idea of “labor as method” through filmic/ media practice, collaborating with the workers to create fragments and storylines of their work and after-work (in the sense of after job loss and after work hours) lives.
Kenzell Huggins: Screening Social Justice in many ways continues the important work in the ethnography of independent film that you started in Not Hollywood (2013). What was the process in your research that led to writing this book, and how does it build on your previous work on media?
Sherry Ortner: I love documentary, partly for its realism, and partly for the fact that it embraces political filmmaking. I had a chapter on (political) documentary in Not Hollywood and I knew I wanted to do more with that. I actually started another ethnographic project, on a now-defunct production company called Participant Media. Participant billed itself as making films “to change the world,” and I wanted to see how they (tried to) do that. But the person who was responsible for my permission to do the work left the company, and anyway I was beginning to get disillusioned with their conception of “changing the world” (see Ortner 2017), so I ended the project and went in search of a company that was doing more radical work. This led me to Brave New Films.
Kenzell Huggins: The concept of “powerful texts” serves as a notable structuring element of the text. It provides a model of how films can come to have a meaningful social and political effect on the world. Could you explain more about how you arrived at this concept, particularly in the context of documentary activism?
Sherry Ortner: I begin Screening Social Justice with famous examples of the role of texts in political consciousness raising – the Bible in the English revolution of the 17th century; newspapers in the American and French revolutions of the 18th century; and the Bible again in the Liberation Theology movement in 20th century Latin America. In all these cases some kind of familiar text, intentionally or simply in practice, became a focal point for new political thinking. And it was able to play this role because it was understood as telling important truths about the world. That was the idea that Robert Greenwald, who founded Brave New Films, wanted to put into practice with his films – not just to put them up on a screen and hope for the best, but to make them part of a collective process of consciousness raising.
Kenzell Huggins: Agency is the other notable structuring element of the text. It serves as the meaningful social and political effect that the powerful texts produced by Brave New Films are supposed to bring about for their viewers; three of the central chapters are organized around different kinds of agency the films are meant to bring about: critical, affective, and networked. Contestations over structure and agency are classic in the social science scholarship on mass media, often oscillating between pitting audiences as either unwitting masses controlled by the screen or valiant re-interpreters of mass texts. What makes agency so important to Screening Social Justice and what does Screening SocialJustice have to say about these classic debates?
Sherry Ortner: The concept of agency (though not necessarily the term) is central to a filmmaking that specifically seeks to bring about social and political change. The whole idea of such filmmaking is to rouse people to action. It is the opposite of (stereotypical) Hollywood movie making, which is meant to make people happy, or to distract them from their troubles, or to otherwise entertain. And the process of activating people politically involves, among other things, activating feelings of capacity, of possibility, of empowerment – all different aspects of agency (remember Obama’s “yes we can!”). So the production of (political) agency had to be the central question for the book.
About the structure/agency debate in film studies, I’m pretty much on the side of Horkheimer and Adorno about the (American) culture industry, that it is primarily a machine for the production of dominant ideology. Of course, there is a range of variation in Hollywood movies, and one can certainly find movies that have a more critical edge. But the main source of challenges to the dominant ideology comes from the world of alternative media and other forms of independent cultural production – independent film, independent journalism, engaged scholarship, and so on. The first chapter in Screening Social Justice provides a little survey of that world and situates Brave New Films within it.
Kenzell Huggins: The “Networked Agency” chapter (and the later section on impact producers in Chapter 5) stands out for focusing attention on stakeholders beyond people on the production end and audience, both groups which tend to be emphasized in scholarship on mass media. Do you think your ability to attend to this social, networked aspect of the mass media process comes from a particularly anthropological or ethnographic stance? What are the horizons or directions for continuing anthropologies of mass media?
Sherry Ortner: Yes, definitely, the idea of plotting the wider social and political networks that Brave New Films works with seemed natural to me as an ethnographer. It’s one of the pleasures of ethnographic work in the indie world – it’s all very networked, whether for political purposes as in the case of Brave New Films, or just more generally, because independent film in general is a kind of movement rather than an industry.
Thinking about horizons or directions for future work in this area, my hope would be that media issues would become a standard and normal part of ethnographic work in general. While at one level it is important and useful to bring those issues into focus in themselves, at another level it important to see them as an active dimension of any ethnographic question in today’s world.
Kenzell Huggins: You introduce the chapter centered on the notion of truth (as constructed in documentary) through the fact that the project began during the first Trump term. The second term has seen renewed attacks on media institutions, often couched as contestations over truth (see, for example, Jimmy Kimmel’s suspension or the slate of defamation lawsuits launched against media institutions like the NYT, BBC, and others). Do these contestations shift how we understand mainstream media and their relationship to truth, vis-à-vis independent, documentary, or otherwise alternative film and their relationship to truth?
Sherry Ortner: I start the book with the chapter on truth because it is the basis of the documentary movement as a whole. It is the combination of truth-telling, and a quasi-ethnographic engagement with real people, that – in my opinion – makes the whole documentary genre so powerful.
But independent media in general, and documentary in particular, operate on a very small scale, and there is always a question of reaching large audiences with those critical perspectives and truths. Mainstream media on the other hand has the mass audience and the resources to make a difference on a large scale. Thus a large part of the effort of alternative media has been to get mainstream media itself to start telling the truth. This has often worked – the media history of public opinion on the Vietnam war is a famous example. So how will this play out if Trump and the radical right succeed in perverting or destroying the mainstream media? The one thing safe to say is that alternative media will be more important than ever.
Reference cited:
Ortner, Sherry B. 2017. “Social Impact Without Social Justice: Film and Politics in the Neoliberal Landscape.” American Ethnologist 44 (3): 528-539.
Grey Gundaker: Although sociology and history of science have been around a long time, it took a while before anthropologists moved into this arena. What, if anything, do you think anthropology adds to or tackles differently from other disciplines?
Götz Hoeppe: This is a great question. One of my favorite quotes is Tim Ingold’s notion that “anthropology is philosophy with the people in.” It goes a long way and explains its difference to much history and sociology that deal with people, too, but often not with the real life of their practical reasoning and acting. Sociologists of science had long focused on bibliometrics and, following Robert Merton, on the normative structure of science. Back in the 1970s, when sociologists Bruno Latour and Karin Knorr Cetina first ventured into scientific laboratories to study knowledge-making practices there, they declared to follow an anthropological approach and did ethnography. Knorr-Cetina, for example, wrote that this meant to look at laboratories with the “innocent eye of the traveller in exotic lands.” Of course, anthropology has much more to offer than ethnography as a method. (And, like linguistic anthropologist Jan Blommaert, I think of ethnography less as a method than as a paradigm that is imbued with its own epistemology and ontology.) But anthropology’s openness toward surprises that Knorr-Cetina alludes to continues to be important. Facing unknown domains, anthropologists are often wary that diverse actors, agencies, and objects may matter to a social setting, not all of which are human. They cannot know in advance which forms social life may take, and if these actors and agencies are members of a culture or community. In the book I focus on what I call data-centric socialities: forms of social coordination unfolding in the making, use, publication, and reuse of digital scientific data. These involve scientists and technicians, students and their supervisors, teams that collaborate and compete, makers and users of data – and always also the technologies and media that they use together.
In putting data and social practices at the center my study, I draw on another strength of anthropology: its attention to sensemaking, embodiment, materiality, and language as essential to a community’s social and cultural life. By focusing on interactions of data makers and data users, I discovered a subtle ethical landscape that is consequential for those affected, but unrecognized by earlier studies. And I noticed that I was not the only ethnographer around: scientists and technicians undertook social inquiries themselves. This is an important practice that novice scientists need to learn. What also fascinated me was how scientists use diagrams as sites for cultivating data, and how their collaborations are organizational experiments for managing their work with large datasets. Probing into the conversations among members of a research team helped me to gain insights into the normative expectations of what people call open science. In this way I also learned that scientists commonly presume what Alfred Schütz called a “reciprocity of perspectives”: they assume that data users act like themselves as they seek to encode their knowledge in a dataset and design it for others to use it properly.
This focus on language and social action led me to matters of social accountability. In fact, accounting practices became my book’s central thread. These practices are implicated in everything I told you so far. The social study of accounting practices begins with a classic ethnography, Edward Evans-Pritchard’s 1937 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. It sounds like an odd inspiration for a study of contemporary scientists, but how the Azande used their oracles and dealt with their often-contradictory outcomes is, in fact, very productive for making sense of scientists’ data practices. Both the Azande and contemporary scientists are concerned with securing membership in their communities and living in a shared world. Another study that I found enormously useful is Larry Wieder’s classic account of the convict code that commits the residents and staff of a half-way house for convicted narcotics offenders to certain ways of communication. This may sound a bit curious as well, but I hope it all makes sense when you read it in context. Scientific data that are good to be used, circulated and reused emerge from accountable social relations.
Grey Gundaker: The main approach you use to study astronomers at work is ethnomethodology, which Harold Garfinkel pioneered to investigate astronomy as a “discovering science.” Why did you choose this path as well? And what additions, changes, or amplifications did you make during your own research in order to make a good fit with current practices in astronomy?
Götz Hoeppe: I discovered ethnomethodology only after my main period of fieldwork. I should add that I am an astronomer-turned-anthropologist: I did a Master of Science in physics with a thesis on radio observations of galaxies and then a PhD in environmental anthropology with an ethnography of a fishing community in Kerala (India). Among fishers and astronomers, I followed people around as they pursued their business and made sense of what they encountered, often collectively. In doing so I documented what ethnomethodologists call “member’s methods.” Only later, when I wrote up my first paper on the project, did I discover that I had adopted elements of an ethnomethodological approach without realizing it.
Incidentally, by having been trained in the science that I then examined I fulfilled what Garfinkel called the “unique adequacy requirement.” He argued that this is needed for studies of expert work. But I also discovered Garfinkel through the anthropologist Mary Douglas, a student of Evans-Pritchard, who took him seriously in the study of accounting practices. Garfinkel and Douglas both learned a lot from Durkheim.
For me, discovering ethnomethodology was a stunning experience. It surprised and fascinated me like no other anthropological or sociological writing before or since. It is an incredible tool to discover how people make sense, how social practices unfold and how we produce social order. But not everything that I witnessed can be seen through an ethnomethodological lens. When you call astronomy a “discovering science” you hint at Garfinkel’s famous pulsar paper, in which he examines a scientific discovery by scrutinizing an audio tape recorded by Steve Woolgar during part of their work. Reading this fascinating article felt as if my brain was being rewired. It is an amazing text. But I do not agree with Garfinkel’s claim that the discovery was constituted and accepted only through the local work that he describes. Historical context often matters in ways that Garfinkel ignored. This is one thing I add in my study. In addition, I pay more attention to documents and media and adopt a more inclusive understanding of accountability. These are some means to bring the local and the distant into a singular account, which I wanted, given that data made at one site are often used at diverse other sites.
Grey Gundaker: “Observation” and “discovery” are terms that the public generally associates with astronomy, physics, and other sciences. Yet these terms can suggest an overly simplistic view of the process– as if the scientist merely sets up and experiment or designates a space or entity to observe and… bingo… new information emerges. Discuss some of the ways that technological and human interactional mediation shape the process of investigation as it actually occurs.
Götz Hoeppe: Indeed, textbooks often describe scientific observation as a sequence of calibrating your equipment, next experimenting or observing, then analyzing what you measure and, eventually, comparing it with the theory. But, in practice, science does not quite work like this. In my book, it is Nadine (pseudonym), who experiences this painfully. I describe her training as a graduate student in Chapter 3. Nadine was meant to combine data from different sources for analysis. This is a common problem of data-rich science, but often also a challenge. Nadine had been meticulous with her data calibrations and when she moved to her analysis, she was thrilled, thinking that she had made an important discovery right away. But Otfried, her supervisor, remained skeptical and asked her to re-calibrate her data. This is what Nadine did – and her discovery disappeared. As she moved on, this happened again. This back-and-forth between calibration and doing science eventually produced a dataset that Otfried and other scientists were happy with and that did, in the end, produce new results. So, Nadine had to suffer through moments of exasperation and frustration. But along this way it was not only her dataset that got calibrated: Nadine herself became a member of a community and culture. Nadine learned to laugh about jokes that only insiders get and to talk about science in ways that outsiders would find as lacking important details. Calibrating data and doing science are essential to becoming a scientist.
Grey Gundaker: Your book also vividly portrays the many layers of contingency involved in astronomers’ work. These include dependence on outside funding and limited telescope time, the hierarchy and distribution of roles among the astronomers, and the complex checks and balances involved in making sense of data sets and rendering them comprehensible to other users. Tell us about how some of this works.
Götz Hoeppe: You are right. Well, in our daily lives we all deal with many contingencies. We miss the last bus and must find another way home. We go shopping, but our favorite salad dressing is out of stock. Likewise, scientists cannot but live in a less-than-perfect world, even though descriptions of science rarely say so. Nadine and her fellow graduate students had to abandon the confidence they had as undergraduate students: that there always is an exact solution to every problem. As elsewhere in life, they now had to find answers to the question, “what is good enough?” and “is this good enough?” Things like working toward a deadline, technical malfunctions or clouded out observing nights lead to smaller datasets than desired, forcing scientists to make hard decision. There are often several contingencies at the same time. What I describe in the book is scientists’ social practice – one may say: social art – of dealing with such contingencies, and doing so creatively and resourcefully. Of course, data may be lacking and projects may fail, but in the work that I witnessed, good enough also means that their work, which is open for criticism and reassessment, remains accountable to others, and is often successful because of people’s artful accommodation of social accountabilities.
Byron Dueck: This fascinating study examines a recent groundswell of work to enshrine expressive practices as intangible cultural heritage in Bolivian law. The “heritage fever” of the title captures, on the one hand, the explosion of heritage lawmaking in Bolivia and, on the other, the heated competition between communities, regions, and nations to claim particular traditions as their own.
Michelle and Henry, the subtitle of the book is “Law and Cultural Politics in a Decolonizing State.” To what degree was the decolonizing project in Bolivia a facilitating or even necessary condition for the explosion of heritage lawmaking you look at? And to what degree is heritage lawmaking a decolonial practice?
Michelle Bigenho and Henry Stobart: Many factors converged through which heritage lawmaking became a regular feature in Bolivia, even if few of these look like decolonizing practices. Keen interest in heritage making sharpened with the 2001 UNESCO declaration of Oruro’s Carnival as a “Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity” and UNESCO’s subsequent 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. Following Evo Morales’ 2006 inauguration as the country’s first Indigenous president, Bolivians wrote a new Constitution (2009) that renamed the country as the Plurinational State of Bolivia and, at least in theory, claimed new levels of inclusion. In the book’s subtitle, we refer to “a decolonizing state” to acknowledge the state’s self-declared “process of change.” As such, in Heritage Fever we take seriously decolonizing as an emic reference laden with hopes and aspirations, even if many of these go unrealized. States indeed are stubborn things. What we see throughout the book are glimpses of decolonizing moves, even if most heritage lawmaking operates in symbolic realms more resonant with mestizo nationalism, often more redolent of colonialism than of decolonization. But readers will find stories in our book about: the heritage-making role of Bolivia’s first Afro-Bolivian elected to the Chamber of Deputies at a time when the Indigenous State (Postero 2017) was on the ascent; a new Indigenous focused committee attached to the Chamber of Deputies that became a key space of legislative heritage making; and the importance to regional heritage making of decolonizing historiography that predated by several decades the founding of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
We also document a democratization of expertise in the heritage-making process, even if many of those building dossiers for heritage lawmaking were not necessarily the culture bearers UNESCO identifies as crucial within the frameworks of the 2003 Convention. Literally anyone could propose a heritage bill, and anyone could present research on the topic to support their bill. Such bills, even if they were not all successful in achieving the status of law, provided novel ways for Bolivians from different walks of life to engage their new state in relation to the politics of culture. In the book, we pay attention to such changes, even as we mark the limitations of decolonizing through heritage making.
Byron Dueck: You wrote this book together and conducted much of the fieldwork jointly. Were there instances when you found you had different or even irreconcilable understandings of interactions, conversations, or events? After practicing ethnography together, do you feel more or less confident about the trustworthiness of ethnographic methods?
Michelle Bigenho and Henry Stobart: This project followed and built on decades of independent solo projects focused on varied aspects of Bolivian music. We also undertook fieldwork together (two trips of one month, a year apart), a new experience for us both, one which we enjoyed immensely. We conducted most of our interviews together, having planned key questions in advance. Here our gendered positions and diverse experiences played out in different and sometimes complementary ways. We did not agree about everything; during fieldwork and writing, we had plenty of debates, sometimes heated. It was usually possible to find ways to compromise, while also accepting that we had different priorities, partially shaped by our different disciplinary backgrounds: anthropology and ethnomusicology.
Back in our respective countries, the US and UK, writing was undertaken at a distance, supported by weekly virtual meetings. The book was co-written throughout, and we tried to read much of the same literature. One of us would write the first draft of a section, which would then be passed across the Atlantic to the other’s desk. After multiple Atlantic crossings and layers of editing (including hilarious confusions between UK and US English), it is sometimes hard to recognize or remember who created the initial draft of a section. A great deal of care and rigor went into our fieldwork and writing in this project, and we often shared concerns about how to represent our research consultants honestly and fairly. Trust is key to ethnographic practice and working collaboratively. Even if this has been challenging at times—we continue to trust in ethnography. If anything, this project has emphasized for us the importance of ethnography and the trust at the heart of it which, with the emergence of AI, becomes ever more important.
Byron Dueck: In your third chapter, you discuss a rural encounter called tinku, one of whose elements involves ritual fighting between participants. You also discuss an urban transformation of tinku called tinkus, a folkloric dance representing the rural practice by means of stylized gestures of belligerence. There seems to be little or no overlap between the people who participate in rural tinku and the people who participate in the urban representation of it. Moreover, the most widely circulating representations of rural tinku, whether by protagonists of the rural practice or practitioners of the urban one, seem to be those of outsiders (and some of these representations have tendencies toward exoticism and stereotype). In this context, does the decolonization of representations of tinku seem possible? If so, what might this look like?
Michelle Bigenho and Henry Stobart: The heritage champions of the tinku are indeed outsiders to its rural ritual context; you astutely point to the disconnect we documented among those who practice the ritual and those who champion it or dance a representation of it in the city. Decolonizing tinku may always fail. As mentioned above, however, we focus on decolonizing as an emic category of the state’s aspirational processes. While decolonization is not a metaphor (Tuck and Yang 2012), nor does it ever reference an achieved state (Hodge 2018). A flicker of decolonizing practices appears in the story about the letter of protest, written by an Indigenous organization and addressed to the mestizo folklore enthusiast organizing the global tinkus dance event. We invite readers to take a look at what happened here. Tinkus as a representation of tinku may never be decolonized, but we follow surprising encounters and articulations that happened during Bolivia’s “process of change.”
Byron Dueck: Your book reveals some substantial disconnections between what ethnographers of expressive culture (for example, anthropologists, ethnomusicologists) see as their remit, on the one hand, and what the general public expects of such academics, on the other. Could you say a little about these disconnections?
Michelle Bigenho and Henry Stobart: We encountered these types of disconnections at various levels. People thought an ethnomusicologist and anthropologist should be hanging out in the contexts of rituals and with the culture bearers of these expressions, amassing a proper documentation of this music and dance, something that might even be used in heritage-making processes. To be fair, our past solo projects involved extensive periods of deep hanging out in such contexts. However, the protagonists proposing music and dance heritage laws often did not perform the music or dances for which they advocated. We wanted to know what was motivating them, just as we wanted to understand the legislative processes they faced and understand the perspectives of legislators and heritage technicians.
Another striking disconnection was evident in our interactions with heritage protagonists. For example, we frequently heard people calling for more research. For them, research was understood as collecting data that could be used to substantiate a heritage claim, for example, to support the contention that a tradition or an instrument had historical origins in Bolivia, rather than Peru. Why were we wasting our time reflecting on state processes, rather than putting our energies into supporting heritage claims? For these legislative purposes, our research was useless. On the other hand, we also witnessed how desire for data or heritage proof motivated local people to conduct their own research about cultural expressions. Advocates from competing regions would undertake research to justify their claim to a tradition. This also meant that anybody could be a researcher.
Byron Dueck: In reflecting on the book, I often found myself thinking about the similarities and differences between you as ethnographers of the legal institutionalization of expressive practice and your protagonists as champions of heritage. There is an element of recursion in the study, a kind of “writing the culture of writing culture.” What does this book have to say about representation, or about representing representers?
Michelle Bigenho and Henry Stobart: You capture well the levels of representation involved in an ethnography of heritage making. As two authors, we came at this project through different trajectories. Michelle, trained as an anthropologist, has always seen expressive cultures as lenses through which to consider other objects of study, like nationalism, discourses of authenticity, transnational cultural labor, and indigeneity. Henry, trained in music, has remained grounded in the histories, dynamics, aesthetics and perceptual worlds of music making, alongside its interactions with, for example, agriculture, technology, and indigeneity. We both came to the topic of this research because individually we noticed a change happening in Bolivia in the early 21st century–a new attention to something everyone was buzzing about: intangible cultural heritage. Our object of study in this book was heritage making through law. Yet we needed to describe or represent in some way the dance/music expressions that were coming under new legal framing. Similarly, those assembling dossiers for a law had to represent the expression they hoped to see enshrined in law. But we operated under different mandates. Heritage champions had to muster representations that would stand as satisfactory evidence for those working in the Ministry of Cultures and Tourism and the new legislative committee we mentioned earlier. We, on the other hand, attempted to find a balance between just enough, but not too much description of materials that could seem tangential to our overall project. We had many debates in our collaborative writing about how much text we should dedicate to the description of the expressive practices central to each heritage-making case the book engages.
We also mark heritage making as a new way of representing Indigenous cultural expressions in the nation-state, even if the representations of representations we trace in the book led more often to nationalist claims before any more profound transborder decolonizing endeavors. Heritage fevers ran particularly high when Bolivia disputed Peru’s UNESCO heritage declarations. Here, good old-fashioned nationalism ruled the day. Indigenous expressive practices have been central to Bolivian nationalism since the 1952 Revolutionary State, in a politics of indigenismo—the exalting of Indigenous expressions as nationalist culture, but without including Indigenous peoples and without transforming Indigenous peoples’ lives. We note the more recent turn of cultural representations as patrimonialismo (from patrimonio, the Spanish word for heritage). Even with its differences from indigenismo, patrimonialismo in a self-declared decolonizing state still produces champions of heritage laws who are usually at least one remove from those who practice the expression.
Byron, we greatly appreciate the time you have taken to read our book, think deeply about it, and pose these thought-provoking questions.
References Cited
Hodge, Christina. 2018. “Decolonizing Collections-Based Learning: Experiential Observation as an Interdisciplinary Framework for Object Study.” Museum Anthropology 41 (2): 142-158.
Postero, Nancy Grey. 2017. The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia. Oakland: University of California Press.
Tuck, Eve and K. Wayne Yang. 2012. “Decolonization is not a Metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1(1):1-40.
Jane Goodman: The idea of the threshold figures in the title of your book and is prominent throughout your analysis. How did you land on the concept of threshold? Is this something you brought to the research, did it emerge through the research, or did you come to it while you were writing?
Tamara Turner: The concept of thresholds emerged across ten years of fieldwork and as I sat in dozens of diwan rituals and searched for ways to describe what I observed. As part of understanding the context of diwan, I reflected on Sufi epistemologies and the fact that the notion of liminality or the in-between emerges again and again. This isthmus between two spaces turns up in the Arabic term, barzakh. However, as I sat through Algerian rituals and felt what was transpiring, those notions didn’t quite fit. Rather than a kind of liminal, third space or in-between space, instead, what I observed was a both-and overlapping space–a kind of two-way contact territory where two or more supposedly opposite notions, feelings, or discourses meet and co-mingle. In that overlap, the borders of opposing concepts blur. The juncture where they meet initiates a threshold where one can be either in both modes at once or can move wholly into one or the other. For example, certain trance songs simultaneously call forth both the energy of an unruly animist spirit and a noble Muslim saint, expressing both Muslim and non-Muslim sensibilities in one phrase. Trance dancers literally dance at the thresholds of conscious states, moving in and out and between various registers of trance. Diwan practitioners, negotiating epistemologies of religion and therapy (seen locally as opposites), similarly debate what they identify as the mixing of sacred and popular contexts in the performance of diwan music even while traces of the sacred can never be cleansed from popular performances: diwan practice resounds the thresholds connecting and complicating polar opposites.
Jane Goodman: You say that you learned about the relationship between music, affect, and trance primarily “through [your] own moving body” (22). Can you tell us a bit about your own embodied or felt experience of attending diwan, particularly given that you were presumably inhabiting multiple roles: you are yourself a musician and were learning the stringed instrument ginbri; you participated in the ritual via trance dancing yourself or by tending to those around you; and you were simultaneously present as an ethnographer attending to the various sounds, colors, and forms of dance/trance while also keeping an eye on your recording equipment. What was the experience of inhabiting and navigating these multiple roles like for you?
Tamara Turner: Indeed, throughout my fieldwork I inhabited so many roles and oftentimes, simultaneously. I didn’t want to miss anything in a ritual that might prove critical later to my analyses. So, in every ritual, I set up an audio recorder, I photographed, took videos of key moments, and scribbled copious field notes. At the same time, I didn’t want to be only up in my head, but also present in my body so that I could experience and potentially learn to feel diwan as it is intended. I was striving to stay open to the stirrings in my own body, not only as part of the participation element of fieldwork, but also as part of my conviction that our bodies pick up on cultural cues and can teach us in ways that go beyond the limits of our minds. To this point, I see myself aligned with Jeanne Favret-Saada and fellow anthropologists writing on embodied epistemologies. (I published a separate book chapter where I zoomed in on this particular aspect). I did learn how to trance dance—having watched others trance for so long, I followed their lead on how to move my torso, arms, and legs. I listened for sensations in my body and let my body lead me as to what it wanted to do. As I did so, I received explicit verbal and physical instruction from ritual leaders, including being told when to get up and dance again or when to move back because my turn was over. This kind of guidance and learning was invaluable. Being in the ritual space with other trance dancers was the sort of embodied learning that shaped my understanding. Being out there, moving to the music in the right way, without impeding or bumping into others and, as a woman, being covered in drapes so that my vision was blocked, proved a lot harder than it looked. Being right there in the space for the direction from ritual leaders gave me glimpses into how both individual and collective healing processes unfold together.
In diwan there are many forms of trance and not all of them involve the spirits inhabiting bodies. Some forms of trance might be compared to absorption or dissociation precipitating on a dance floor. I considered myself to be learning how to master these forms of trance in diwan, while my interlocutors saw my states as involving spirits and nonhuman entities. From their perspective, the spirits were interacting with me; I just didn’t realize it. This difference in perspective was ripe with learning potential.
Jane Goodman: Did this project mark your own psycho-spiritual pursuits in ways that you continue to cultivate? For example, did you develop an affinity for any particular spirit, and if so, (a) how did you experience this? and (b) Is this affinity something you can foster outside of Diwan?
Tamara Turner: Absolutely. Long before I embarked on this research, I wanted to better understand what healing and wellness could mean across cultures and across different orientations to the world. Although my family were not particularly religious, I had always had an interest in psychology, health, and in the wisdom traditions of other cultures. My father was a professor of sociology with specialties in the sociology of deviance as well as religion and medicine, so I grew up with big questions about how humans make meaning and understand their place in the world.
I also grew up composing and playing music. It was as a composer that I wanted to learn other non-Western musical vocabularies and this curiosity led me to ethnomusicology. When I first discovered Moroccan gnawa music in the mid-2000s, something in me knew I had to go there and learn more. The combination of ritual, psychology, medicine, healing and music encapsulated everything that I wanted to pursue. After completing an MA on ritual musicianship in Marrakech, and through a series of serendipitous events, I set off to explore Algerian diwan in 2013 and that began the long journey to publishing this book.
In terms of my own personal experience across ten years of fieldwork in Algeria, I noticed that I had emotional affinities for certain songs. I will never forget the first time I found myself sobbing to one song and had no idea why. My Algerian friends announced that that was my song and from that time forward, the musicians made a point to play it for me. Later in my fieldwork, other songs stirred strange sensations in me too, and I collected them as my favorites. Some of these were from the Hausa repertoire which is often skipped in ritual because it comes very late in the night. I discuss this part of my journey in the book because it served as a primary form of learning. I aimed to be open to my body and what was happening and I let my Algerian friends guide me in the process.
Moreover, it did not escape my attention that – with the colonial history of anthropology and the pattern of outsiders determining what they understood to be what is going on in another culture, as if they hold a position of epistemological authority – that my Algerian friends informing me what was going on with my own intimate bodily sensations and experiences, whether I agreed or not, was a delightful miniature reversal of those power dynamics.
Jane Goodman: The diwan ritual leaders (moqeddemin) were critical to your project. Describe how one moqeddem marked you in particular ways.
Tamara Turner: The most profound relationship I had with a moqeddem in Algeria was with Moqeddem Jallul Motam from the city of Saida, who is quoted and mentioned throughout the book. Jallul still practices many of the old ways, striving to keep the ritual protocol in line with his ancestors’ recommendations, and sticking by what he grew up with. His knowledge of the spirit world called to mind the Songhay sorcerers in Paul Stoller’s work. It was clear to me that what I learned from Jallul was just scratching the surface of his knowledge and lifeworld. There was so much he couldn’t share with me but gave me only hints of, such as the danger and risk in working with the spirit world where not all entities are benevolent. As I mentioned in the text, the role of the moqeddem in Algeria is dying out and there are few people left who still perform the role as it was intended: the commander of the spirit world and the one who protects the energy of the ritual. Jallul could command a room with a single glance. In one of the first conversations we had in 2013, I recall his challenge to me to really try and understand diwan. He had been quite disappointed by journalists who occasionally went to Saida to learn about the diwan ritual. He had never been satisfied with their depiction of the practice and what I would later understand to be the ways that Black communities in Algeria are still portrayed. It was my single intention to do justice to the countless diwan practicants, like Jallul, who so badly wanted to be taken seriously and acknowledged for their own wisdom.
Turner, Tamara. D. (2023). Learning to trance: The affective grounding of becoming another body in another place. In E. Pierini, A. Groisman, & D. Espírito Santo (Eds.), Other worlds, other bodies: Embodied epistemologies and ethnographies of healing (pp. 153-171). New York: Berghahn.
Tsung-Lun Alan Wan: In your book, your discussion of signing songs really stood out to me. From my experience in Taiwan, signed songs are a highly contested genre. Historically, when the Taiwanese government attempted to erase regional variation in Taiwan Sign Language, they hired hearing experts and special education teachers to compile sign-language dictionaries, including books of signed songs (!), which were then criticized as promoting signed Chinese rather than Taiwan Sign Language by the signing community.
In many hearing-led signed-song performances, lyrics are translated word by word into signs, handshapes are modified for choreography, and signs are sometimes invented for aesthetic effect. As a result, these performances may become unintelligible to deaf people, while allowing hearing performers to enjoy a form of supposed sign language that overlooks deaf perspectives and sign-language conventions. In contrast, the work of some deaf artists in Taiwan seems much closer to what you describe in your book: they begin from the meaning of the lyrics, select appropriate signs, and then adapt them rhythmically and aesthetically to the music, but this is not as popular as those led by hearing and circulated among hearing people.
For readers outside the U.S. who may not be familiar with the American context of signed songs, could you share why you chose translation/interpretation in signed songs as a research topic? What made this genre theoretically or ethnographically important for you?
Kristin Snoddon: Thank you for sharing these insights and experiences from the Taiwan context. I did not know about the government’s attempts to erase regional variations of Taiwanese Sign Language. To understand how signed songs can provoke controversy, it may be important to consider how sign languages are often viewed as a means to an end–a translation–that also functions as a vessel to convey something–such as signed Chinese and cultural artefacts from hearing communities like music. It’s another issue as to how signed Chinese (like signed English) is often presented as a standard, hegemonic language variety when so much that makes sign languages intelligible to deaf people is missing from manually coded Chinese and English.
The artist whom I interviewed in my book, Robert Bhola, had disparaging words to say about many hearing-led signed-song performances. But as you say, some hearing people–who are apparently the majority of song signers on the Internet–enjoy creating and consuming this work. I do not think deaf people in general are usually as interested in signing songs or viewing signed translations of popular music–but this can also be culture-specific, and many deaf people enjoy various forms of musical participation.
When I began to explore the topic of deaf interpreters and sign language ideologies, musical translation in signed songs was a research topic that inspired me, because I found Robert’s work–like that of other deaf and hard of hearing song signers like Rosa Lee Timm–to be inspiring. This was due not only to the artist’s sign language proficiency but also to being able to convey the essential message contained in a song. This makes the signed song an artistic creation in its own right. In my book, deaf interpreters are presented as exceptional facilitators of intelligibility. With signing songs, this extends to making intelligible what might otherwise be inaccessible and beyond ordinary language, such as the tone and instrumentals of a song. Theoretically and ethnographically, I was interested in the struggle to cross borders when there are sensory asymmetries and unequal access to semiotic resources. To make something intelligible, you need to understand what is intelligible to the other person–to know something about what it is like to live in that person’s body. I do not think the message always gets through, maybe because the other person also needs to be willing and open to receive it.
Tsung-Lun Alan Wan: I really like the phrasing: “the struggle to cross borders.” It made me think of a point you make in the book: that some hearing people assume communication with deaf people must be mediated by a sign language interpreter, while in some situations, other modalities such as email and the chat box during a video meeting may allow for a more direct form of interaction between deaf and hearing interlocutors. I had previously tended to assume that, compared with writing things down, communicating through a sign language interpreter would be a more respectful way for hearing people to interact with deaf signers. But your discussion helped me see that, what matters may be whether the hearing interlocutor is willing to participate in the struggle of crossing borders with “sensory asymmetries and unequal access to semiotic resources”.
This also reminds me of a small scene I recently witnessed in Taiwan. A deaf mother was ordering food at a bento shop. The staff at the counter took out paper and a pen, assuming that she would need to write down her order. The customer signed “troublesome” in TSL, which the staff obviously did not understand. Then the customer pointed directly to the items on the menu. At that moment, the staff seemed to realize that, within that semiotic environment, the deaf customer did not need paper and writing at all. The menu itself, pointing, and the shared material setting were already sufficient for communication.
I found this small moment of boundary negotiation very interesting. It seems to show that communication access is not always about introducing an additional mediating tool or person. Sometimes it is about recognizing and learning to use the semiotic resources that are already available in the interactional environment, hence a collaborative way of doing communication. Would you say that this is a fair reading of your argument?
Kristin Snoddon: I agree that it can often appear more respectful to the deaf person to communicate via a sign language interpreter, and indeed it is often the default mode of communication for deaf academics working with hearing colleagues and students. However, some of my favourite moments have taken place when the hearing interlocutor–such as a student, faculty colleague, or an audience member during a presentation–understands me, and I understand them, and we exchange ideas even when the interpreter does not know what we are talking about. I think this can also be a mark of successful interpretation since the interpreter does not manage the discussion. As John Lee Clark said to me once, we should try and hear what lives beyond translation and what lives in the gaps.
The scene with the deaf mother ordering food resonates with me–while it was kind and well meaning of the staff to offer a paper and pen, it is much quicker to point at a menu. I think there is also a point to be made here about distantism–what John calls a standing apart, an insistence on adhering to normative communication via sight and hearing. In the scene you describe, the pen and paper offered a more detached, formal, and logocentric way of communicating that appears almost circumlocutory as compared to simply pointing at a menu.
So I agree with you about communication access and efficiency, and making use of resources in the environment to achieve immediate goals. Part of making this work is collaborative–what Mara Green refers to as the willingness to co-construct meaning when there are sensory asymmetries. The other part is creative–seeing how to make use of the affordances of objects and instruments that another person who typically faces fewer communication barriers may not have previously realized were latent in the environment.
Tsung-Lun Alan Wan: Yes, distantism seems to be a very important entry point here, and it was one of the concepts in your book that felt truly illuminating to me. I agree that distantism speaks to many of the issues you discuss in the book, including the possibility of more direct collaborative communication rather than a more circumlocutory form of mediation through a third material object (or person). This also connects to the third part of your book on ethnography at Carnival in Trinidad and Tobago. There, the focus seems to move away from translating music into signed song and toward a more direct experience of music through fleeting vibration, touch, movement, and affect. You frame this partly in terms of epistemology, which seems to suggest that how we define certain forms of interaction as more direct, and others as “standing apart,” is itself grounded in culturally specific understandings.
This makes me curious about the role of modality here. Is modality as decisive as the formulation of distantism, with its critique of the dominance of sight and hearing, might seem to suggest?
I once met a young deaf-blind man at a disability studies forum in Taipei. When he introduced himself to me, he explained to me that he could not see sign language, so he didn’t think about learning it. I mentioned that tactile signing has been developing in the United States, but he did not seem especially interested. For him, it was more desirable to have hearing people speak into a microphone, have their speech converted into text through AI speech recognition, and then enlarge that text on his iPad screen so that he could still read it (also the way he received language from me).
In this case, he seemed to believe having our interaction mediated by AI speech recognition and a tablet interface is a more direct way of communication, compared to involving a third party human interpreter (it is also likely because he has never experienced tactile signing, so for him of course it is more distant). This makes me wonder how we can take seriously the problem of “standing apart” without assuming in advance that certain modalities are necessarily more direct, more intimate, or more connecting?
Kristin Snoddon: I agree there is a potential tension between the critique of distantism and that of autonomy in communication. The critique of distantism arises in the context of deafblind communicative practices, where there has been a movement to foreground direct experience and contact instead of trying to emulate normative communication. In this case, normative communication has often meant communication through a sign language interpreter because this is a normal practice in sighted deaf communities–many deafblind people are or have been part of deaf communities prior to losing their vision. The Protactile community in the USA arose in the context of deafblind community members having to talk with each other through interpreters and not being able to communicate directly. For direct communication with each other, they needed a language based on touch, which is Protactile. So I agree this is a culturally specific understanding of distantism that privileges tactile (and olfactory) modalities, including proprioception, over sight and hearing. Many social norms for appropriate behaviour and language needed to be overcome in order for this understanding to arise.
But the point of anti-distantism arguments is to claim residence in the world as an autonomous being, despite these social norms that govern human behaviour and language. I advance this critique of distantism in my book when writing about deaf people’s direct experience of music at Trinidad Carnival instead of via a song signer or interpreter–the latter is also a logocentric orientation toward music and understanding compared to being immersed in the experience of Carnival. So I would argue that the young man you describe is acting in accord with an anti-distantist view that supports autonomy if he is choosing to communicate using speech-to-text technology. There is no right or wrong way to use language as long as it works for us.
There is a social movement to share Protactile with deafblind community members and interpreters or co-navigators through training workshops because learning Protactile opens up communication for many people. I know that encountering signing deaf communities and learning sign language changed my entire life. However, there needs to be an opportunity and an incentive to learn a new language and modality for communication.
Tsung-Lun Alan Wan: The final question — in the last part of your book, you discuss how the intersection of deafness and queer identity may further marginalize gay deaf people in Trinidad and Tobago, especially when hearing sign language interpreters may refuse to interpret LGBTQ+ content because of their homophobic beliefs. You also show how PT, a deaf Caribbean interpreter, intervenes in this situation and also does work translating LGBTQ+ identity terms for the local LGBTQ+ deaf community. I found this to be a powerful example of linguistic flourishing, one of the core concepts in your book. We know that, in neurodiversity advocacy, there is more and more discussion on flourishing in relation to individual well-being and the creation of conditions that allow neurodivergent people to live well. It is nice to see linguistic flourishing theorized from the perspective of deaf epistemology. Could you say more about how you understand linguistic flourishing in relation to “being understood”? What might this concept allow applied linguistics to see or ask differently, and how would you like the field to engage with it further?
Kristin Snoddon: I am glad that you recognized the presence of linguistic flourishing in this chapter through sign language practices related to Trinbagonian LGBTQI+ identities. In some ways, this chapter was the most difficult for me to write with respect to my positionality as someone who is an outsider to Caribbean and LGBTQI+ communities (not to mention deaf interpreter communities, since I am not a DI). The issues of positionality and difference are fundamentally related to understanding because there are central aspects of identity and experience that we can never understand firsthand if we do not share a particular social identity and lived experience with someone else. At the same time, I believe there is a common desire to be understood, including by people who are different from us, which may be felt more by those whose experiences are minoritized. This includes understanding our own experiences as part of a process of self-actualization.
Experiences of not being understood and of communication barriers are a central part of deaf lives. Because these experiences and barriers shape language practices, I would like the field of applied linguistics to engage with them further by exploring their impacts when there are sensory asymmetries. In the context of deaf epistemology, linguistic flourishing happens when there is an anticipation that what we are saying–in whatever form this takes–will be understood. In the chapter, PT describes learning a language to identify and express their own experiences as a queer person, and how this in turn opens up the possibility for new experiences and ways of building identity. But these processes rely on having access to alliances and coalitions with various kinds of people that can support flourishing.
Jie Wu: Your framework draws on anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, epidemiology, communication, and game studies. How do you navigate the tensions between these disciplines, especially given their different assumptions about mind, agency, and causality? Do you see your work as integrating these fields, or more as translating between them?
Jeffrey Snodgrass: Psychologists focus on individual mental structures and processes such as attention, cognition, emotion, motivation, and personality. Anthropologists highlight the importance of culture, in the sense of socially shared and learned knowledge and practice. As a psychological anthropologist, I integrate perspectives from each of these fields to emphasize how individual minds can be more fully understood by considering their social and cultural context. So, for example, I focus in the book on the underlying cognitive capacity to temporarily visualize and embody an alternative possible self (Markus & Nurius, 1986) such as a spirit or deity (in a religious setting) or a character (in gaming contexts). However, I show how specific local cultural traditions sanction and thus shape how spirit mediums and role-players alike enact and experience these alternate and even ideal secondary selves. In these terms, I highlight the human capacity to cultivate and identify with alternative vehicles or vessels for the self that come to feel real—what I term an avatar faculty—while also showing the quite variable forms those secondary selves can take. This approach has been referred to as universalism without uniformitarianism (Cassaniti & Menon, 2017). I aim to integrate these disciplinary approaches to reveal mental and behavioral processes that are at once individual and sociocultural rather than simply translating between or across the perspectives of psychology and anthropology.
Further, I show in the book how by uniting with an avatar—that imagined vehicle that gives form to one’s secondary self—one can inhabit alternate realities and accomplish new kinds of things in ways that can be psychosocially beneficial. Thus, coming to experience oneself as a deity, and having others accept that identity as valid, can provide the possessed with new sources of social belonging and status. In the central case I describe in the book, that of Bedami of the Bhat community, this helps her to mend fractures she experienced with other members in her group, helping to re-integrate her and her husband with her natal family. That in turn helped Bedami personally, alleviating sources of stress and conflict in her life, which contributed to her overall health and well-being. For gamers, skillfully enacting an avatar identity—as a warrior, a healer, a hero—can also provide players with an elevated secondary identity and status, which, as with Bedami Bhat, could spill out into the actual world. I learned that players could come to understand themselves differently in their offline lives, for example, as more able to enact and complete projects that were important to them. In theoretical terms, their sense of self-efficacy or agency had been enhanced, which in turn could strengthen their overall sense of identity and well-being.
These additional examples demonstrate the implications this research has for health fields such as clinical psychology, psychiatry, and epidemiology and for religious and games studies. My ability to make potentially novel contributions to these fields again emerges from my integrative psychological anthropological approach. I would add that a psychologist might use a term like self-efficacy to discuss the way that internal and somewhat enduring self-representations can shape one’s capacity to make choices and act independently, while an anthropologist would more likely frame such issues with the term agency or even moral agency to emphasize how social contexts propel individuals to pursue actions that are personally meaningful and culturally valued. So, there is undoubtedly a degree of translation between these fields’ terminologies in the book, and that might help readers from different disciplines avoid talking past each other. Nonetheless, even here, my primary aim remains integrative, in the sense that I want to illuminate how individual choices, actions, and well-being are constrained both by inner self-concepts and external sociocultural contexts. Avatars illustrate such hybrid psychosocial processes in the way they allow us to project an oftentimes more idealized internal vision or concept of ourselves into external forms—spirits, characters—that are shaped and constrained by culture-specific expectations and behavioral scripts. Overall, I develop in the book a psychological anthropological framework that is ideally better able to address these and other behavioral and health questions as compared to any single disciplinary approach.
Jie Wu: You propose an avatar faculty, a general human capacity to identify with or project consciousness into alternative self-objects, expressed across culturally diverse practices such as spirit possession, shamanic trance, and immersive digital gaming. While these phenomena differ significantly in context and interpretation, you argue they share a common underlying structure involving absorption, dissociation, and identity transfer. What is gained analytically or epistemically by framing these as expressions of a universal capacity, rather than treating them as culturally specific but only loosely comparable practices?
Jeffrey Snodgrass: The book’s central comparison is between what we might call sacred role-play of Rajasthani spirit mediums and secular role-play as we might find in digital or tabletop role-playing games. Both allow for the temporary transformation of players into culturally sanctioned identities—spirits or characters—who confront and resolve challenges, thus providing rehearsal spaces for meaning making, identity formation, and the transmission of culturally scripted responses to adversity into everyday life. However, as I show extensively in the book, the specific transformations that occur are constrained and shaped by cultural expectations and scripts that in the end, yes, mean that a spirit medium’s compared to a gamer’s avatar transformation can look quite different (for my team’s latest on this line of thinking, see Snodgrass et al., 2026).
As alluded to above in my response to your first question, and as echoed here, universal does not mean uniform or completely the same. Rather, developing the idea of an avatar faculty implies there are features that are shared across contexts that can be productively compared to each other. The pragmatist in me asks: Is this abstraction useful or productive in some way?
So, yes, the notion that there is an avatar faculty is an abstraction, which identifies a parallel between spirit possession and gaming. But that’s the role of theory and analysis, as I understand it. In this case, I hope the abstraction is a useful one, which might help readers see these and other phenomena in new and even parallel ways.
In fact, one aim of the book is to develop avatar as an analytical categorythat highlights how a general human capacity to cultivate alternative representations of the self (avatars) can help religiously minded persons and gamers alike to enact the good life. This highlights how non-western categories of thought can usefully ground analysis outside of their original ethnographic and historical contexts.
This is to say that one response to your question would be to turn it back on you and ask: Why resist using avatar in this abstract analytical manner, when we (as psychologists or anthropologists) might commonly employ other abstract terms such as consciousness, identity, mind, self-efficacy, agency, community, culture, power, religion, ritual, trance, play, or games?
Yes, we can—and many have—similarly critiqued each of these terms as well. Yet, these ideas still can prove themselves to be analytically useful, and I would hope this might also be the case with my use of avatar. That is, my analysis might encourage readers to think in new ways about their relationships to secondary selves or identities in their own lives, along with the benefits they might enjoy from enacting those alternate identities.
Jie Wu: You describe a shift from your earlier ethnographic work in Rajasthan, conducted largely as a solo researcher, to later work on World of Warcraft carried out collaboratively with students and co-researchers. How did this transition shape your research design, particularly in terms of data collection, participant observation, and interpretation?
You also mention the Ethnographic Teaching and Research Laboratory (ERTL), where students were trained to conduct repeated fieldwork in gaming environments over multiple semesters. How did this structured training model affect the consistency and comparability of data across different student cohorts, and how did you maintain coherence in multi-researcher ethnography?
Jeffrey Snodgrass: Let me address these questions by telling you how the book’s research came about.
I have a longstanding interest in the power of stories, for example, beginning most fully with my dissertation research on the Rajasthani Bhat community, who were professional poets, puppeteers, and storytellers (Snodgrass, 2006). The seed for this book was planted when as a new professor I was brainstorming creative ways to teach anthropological research methods to my students. I came up with the idea of leading a research team insideWorld of Warcraft, an online game that some in my tabletop roleplaying group were playing at the time. The idea was that we would conduct field observations and interviews, interacting with other players’ characters or avatars, inside this game-world.
I thought of games like World of Warcraft as dynamic, living stories, where players actively take on character roles rather than just reading about or viewing them as one might in a novel or film. In fact, that’s in part how I thought about spirit possession, something I had earlier studied (and continue to study) in India. In part because of my relation to the Bhat community, I thought of spirit possession as performances of a kind, and stories, where the possessed would strongly identify with gods and spirits and then act out those identifications in ritual contexts.
The deeper I delved, the more I became interested in the relationships and exchanges a person might have with such secondary (performative) selves. In spirit possession, the possessed person comes to think of themselves as the avatar or vehicle-vessel of some spiritual entity. But still the god or spirit is a second self of a kind. In games like World of Warcraft, the character or avatar is the vehicle or vessel of the player’s consciousness. The player projects themselves into the character.
So, to answer your questions more directly, bringing student collaborators into the research process and developing my lab changed how I thought about research. The heart of my research remains ethnographic, relying on participant-observation and interviews. That’s where I continue to make big discoveries and have my “aha” moments, like seeing health and wellbeing parallels between spirit possession and gaming.
Those discoveries follow what the American pragmatist philosopher CS Peirce referred to as a logic of abductive inference: When encountering perplexing new observations, what concept might we posit to explain those phenomena or data? In my case, I thought that enhanced social status or prestige helped explain the health and wellbeing benefits of identifying with avatars in both ritual and gaming contexts (for more on abductive logic, see Snodgrass, Dengah II, et al., 2024; Snodgrass, Lacy, Dengah II, et al., 2024).
To my mind, there is no better mode than ethnography to discover new things about the world. But I am now more committed to the idea that we anthropologists, who are so keen to discover things about the world via our largely qualitative methods, should and can also put our ideas at risk and attempt to further confirm or even falsify them (in the language of philosopher of science Karl Popper (2005)) with alternate modes of inquiry. Quantifiable field survey results, which are presented in greater detail in the book’s appendices, can prove helpful here. Ethnographically sensitive counting helps one clarify the wider distribution within a group of a certain pattern like a relationship between gaming immersion and stress relief. One can also check for whom, and with what qualifications those patterns hold, again using quantitative analyses that include covariates like gender, socioeconomic status, and age. These larger patterns and distributions can be very difficult to detect via qualitative methods alone.
This is why I follow a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach to ethnographic analysis (Snodgrass, Lacy, Wutich, et al., 2024). Approaching a phenomenon through various analytical avenues increases my confidence in a particular finding. Yes, there is the risk of loss of coherence, as you allude to. However, careful documentation of the relevant cultural contexts associated with each dataset helps my various teams avoid that. So, it is ultimately the ethnographer’s sensitivity to context that helps preserve the integrity of the analysis, in a mode of inquiry we might call ethnographic science (Aunger, 2003).
Cassaniti, J. L., & Menon, U. (2017). Universalism without Uniformity: Explorations in Mind and Culture. University of Chicago Press.
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41(9), 954.
Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.
Snodgrass, J. G. (2006). Casting kings: Bards and Indian modernity. Oxford University Press.
Snodgrass, J. G., Dengah II, H. J. F., Sagstetter, S. I., & Zhao, K. X. (2024). Causal inference in ethnographic research: Refining explanations with abductive logic, strength of evidence assessments, and graphical models. PLOS ONE, 19(5), e0302857.
Snodgrass, J. G., Lacy, M. G., Dengah II, H. J. F., Zhao, K. X., & Sagstetter, S. I. (2024). Sharpening causal reasoning in applied ethnographic research. Human Organization, 83(4), 389–400. https://doi.org/10.1080/00187259.2024.2412986
Snodgrass, J. G., Lacy, M. G., Wutich, A., Bernard, H. R., Oths, K. S., Beresford, M., Bendeck, S., Branstrator, J. R., Dengah II, H. J. F., Nelson, R. G., Ruth, A., Sagstetter, S. I., SturtzSreetharan, C., & Zhao, K. X. (2024). Deep hanging out, mixed methods toolkit, or something else? Current ethnographic practices in US anthropology. Annals of Anthropological Practice, 48(1), 20–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/napa.12213
Snodgrass, J. G., Sagstetter, S. I., Chakrabarti, C., Branstrator, J. R., Zhao, K. X., Lacy, M. G., DengahII, H. J. F., Wagner, A., Giardina, A., & Billieux, J. (2026). Tabletop Role-Playing Games as Drama Therapy in the Wild: Developing Personal Bonds with Characters Improves Players’ Self-Concepts. Transcultural Psychiatry, 13634615261418363. https://doi.org/10.1177/13634615261418363
Kenzell Huggins: This book draws from an eclectic mix of data, building on ethnographic exploration of Irish music sessions, interviews with members of a Los Angeles independent music scene, to the history of early touring musicians. What inspired you to combine these contexts throughout the book, and what did thinking across these contexts contribute to the formation of your arguments about value?
Timothy Taylor: I might as well start with a confession: my Ph.D. was in historical musicology, though I have slowly drifted towards ethnomusicology—the department where I am housed at UCLA—and anthropology, having married a prominent anthropologist over thirty years ago. Musicology, when I was taught, was concerned mainly with western European classical music and, to some extent, jazz. The rest of the world’s musics were left to ethnomusicologists. (The study of popular music didn’t really break in until the 1990s, and that came from cultural studies, not the music fields, though they eventually picked it up.) So, I was well, if conventionally, trained in western European classical music, which explains that discussion in the book, which considers the rise of the virtuoso, aided by agents, who helped create musical spectacles to generate income.
Once I started to read anthropological value theory (with thanks here to Steve Feld, Hannah Appel, and Jessica Cattelino)—especially Terry Turner, David Graeber, Anna Tsing, and Fred Myers—I began to consider I began to consider or rethink issues related to conceptions of value in music scenes with which I was familiar—the LA indie rock scene (with help from one of my graduate students Shelina Brown), and the (meager) Irish traditional music scene in LA, in which I am an active participant as a wooden flute player.
Kenzell Huggins:Throughout the text you reject an all-encompassing view of capitalism as always already structuring all forms of value-making. Instead, you show how separate regimes of value are absorbed by capital or even maintained as a certain kind of reserve (Chap. 5). How do we protect or cultivate these spaces of cultural production hopefully outside of capitalism? For outsides maintained as reserves, should branded capitalist endorsement be viewed as lifelines promoting growth, exploitation, or perhaps something else?
Timonty Taylor: Before I started to read value theory, I was nonetheless immersed in questions about capitalism, globalization, and more specifically, commodification and consumption. There seems to me to have been a tacit assumption in the music fields and in cultural studies that popular music was a commodity in some kind of straightforward and unchanging way. Many famous writings in anthropology contradict this idea of the stability of the commodity situation (as Appadurai calls it), of course, but these writings that might disabuse us of that notion weren’t always read, at least in the corner of academia I inhabit. So, a good deal of my recent work has been to complicate conceptions of music as a commodity.
I continued to be interested in questions of commodification and, more recently, scalability (thanks to Anna Tsing). It may seem that capitalism suffuses our world, which is awash in commodities. But most of the musicians I know aren’t able to commodify their music or commodify it to the extent that they can scale its consumption sufficient to make a living. Capitalism may appear to be everywhere, but as we know from Tsing and others, it comes and goes from patches around the world. Capitalism is a set of hegemonic ideologies—a structure in the practice theory sense—but actual practices on the may or may not by shaped by it.
I’ve come to think of capitalism as a kind of hegemonic environment but not total, and with nodes of concentrated capitalist activity, like record labels or film and television studios (my interests) but also, of course, obvious places such as bangs and the tech industry. Focusing on agents such as music managers (or matsutake mushroom gatherers) helps us understanding how capitalist value can be created.
Given its reach and hegemony, it’s easy to attribute agency to capitalism; I do it myself. It’s simpler to say that capitalism did something, or that something happened because of capitalism. Instead of talking so much about capitalism as though it were an agent, we need to think about the actual human agents: who is figuring out ways that something that was previously uncommodified is transformed into a commodity? Commodities are so prevalent that they blind us to other forms of the creation of value and its exchange, as we know from Mauss and others, but many things are never commodified; most music isn’t.
We need to attend to specific cases, which is what I do in some chapters, like the one on music managers. People attempting to get into the record business seldom have any idea of how that business works—they need a manager who can help educate them and mold them into people who can generate surplus value for a label. I’m interested in such figures as these.
As for the question about protecting those forms of cultural production outside of capitalism, I’m not sure that’s our remit. But I would say that they’re all over, we just tend not to take them seriously. Most people who study music—from whatever disciplinary perspective—tend to study the extraordinary musicians. But these are rare; there are many more musicians who aren’t extraordinary, aren’t making a living. They are, however, making value, for themselves and perhaps others and are no less worthy of study.
Kenzell Huggins: In Chapter 2, you argue that music industries have historically acknowledged that creative production is hard to scale because there are limits on how much new work any given musician can produce. However, you spend some time on counterexamples, including a brief gesture to the Korean music industry, especially K-pop, as industries that are modeled on the manufacturing of stars and hits (p. 44-45). What does the still-growing success of the Korean music industry (most recently exemplified by the success of K-Pop Demon Hunters [2025], perhaps) have to tell us about the possibilities of scaling cultural production to create value?
Timothy Taylor: Until fairly recently, people in the record business would seek and sign multiple acts that they thought might be profitable. But a few decades ago, the cultural business (such as music, publishing, film, and others) shifted to a blockbuster model, since it’s much cheaper to sign one artist who could sell seven million albums than to signing seven artists who can sell a million each, because you’re only producing one recording so there’s much less studio time and money, less money expended on marketing and advertising, and so forth. The rise of social media makes it much easier for record labels to discern who has a large following, how active and skilled an artist is on social media (which matters a great deal today), how adept they are at creating, maintaining, and increasing their fan base. This is the main way that the western record business tries to achieve scalability.
I’m not a scholar of K-pop, but the Korean case seems to me to be unique. It’s more like the old model except more industrialized: young musicians are located, trained, groomed for stardom; as far as I know, there is a kind of industrial infrastructure unlike anything in the west. Some achieve it, some don’t. If it doesn’t exist already, it would be useful to have an ethnography of how this all works, especially in the context of South Korea’s rise to becoming an industrial giant in the same period.
There is, however, the case of Sweden. A few decades ago, the Swedes realized that their country was profiting more from ABBA and other popular musicians than from iron. The government began subsidizing local music centers that lent people instruments, amps, and other gear so that there were few or no barriers to making music. Sweden is now one of the top exporters of music in the world, along with the US, UK, and South Korea.
Kenzell Huggins: Cultural commentators increasingly claim that the models of other cultural production industries (like film and television) are shifting away from non-scalable creative labor to increasingly mechanized or manufactured models. The adoption of generative artificial intelligence in these industries also threatens traditional assumptions about the scalability of creativity. Both issues of labor as well as the threat of generative AI were principal concerns of the 2023 Hollywood strikes. How do models of creative cultural production have to change to account for emerging technological shifts and evolving labor practices?
Timothy Taylor: There is already AI-generated music and I’m sure that there will be much more. Music not deemed to be important (in advertising, background to homemade videos, and so on) will be largely AI-generated. But to be clear, unimportant music has existed for centuries; most music served some sort of tangible, visible, function, in worship, dance, entertainment, passing the time while working, to demonstrate one’s power over others, and more. Mozart once complained to his father that at one concert, “I had to play to the chairs, tables, and walls”—the aristocrats in attendance considered his music to be part of the background. Only since the rise of the idea of art-for-art’s-sake in the nineteenth century was some music—western European classical music—placed on a pedestal and exalted for not having any function, except perhaps for enlightening and ennobling bourgeois listeners, and later, for demonstrating social status. Bespoke music will increasingly become a boutique item, something relatively rare and special. It will become a touted feature of certain television shows and films.
Kenzell Huggins: On page 140-141, you write about the need for music studies to produce new scholarship beyond functionalist reassertions of the ability of music to represent and sustain community, suggesting that a Geertzian attention to social actors’ own meanings as values can help to provide routes to innovative scholarship. This is a compelling call to action. What do you think are the horizons of research for cultural and social scientific studies of music and other media? What is the role of classic theories in informing (or not!) those horizons?
Timothy Taylor: I have been trying my whole career—thirty-plus years—to bringing more social theory, especially from anthropology, into the music fields. It has been a slow process. Most of us start as musicians and are thus drawn to particular kinds of music to study, which we tend to examine in fairly technical ways. It has been difficult to break this formalistic orientation; some people in ethnomusicology view knowledge of social theory as a a kind of capital to be flaunted; some think theory takes one away from “the music itself”; some think it will compromise one’s ethnography because it transforms the ethnographer from a blank, all-observing slate into someone who can only see class struggle or the patriarchy or racism or homophobia or something else.
At UCLA, I created a specialization in anthropology in my department. Graduate students who opt in take the three core courses in UCLA’s Anthropology Department and must write one of their Ph.D. qualifying exams under the aegis of an anthropologist, and must have an anthropologist on their dissertation committee. Many of our students following this specialization, and I think it has helped them considerably in their dissertation design, research, and writing. And it helps make them stronger candidates on the job market.
As for the future, I think that we need to continue to attend to real people in real places and times. Theory needs an object; I have no interest in what Bourdieu called “theoretical theory.” We must put theory in constant dialogue with our ethnographic data—and vice versa. To echo what I said above, I also think it’s of paramount importance to look not just at capitalism but as capitalists: who is making decisions that, to recall Anna Tsing one last time, introduce alienation? Commodification? Scalability?
Here’s an example. I have a friend who accompanied President Obama to Cuba in 2016 after the president had normalized relations. The Rolling Stones gave a free concert during Obama’s visit, and Coca-Cola wanted to sponsor an after-party. But there was a problem—as my friend put it, “In Cuba, Cuba is the brand.” So, Raúl Castro was approached, and he gave his permission. My friend said that for the next concert, potential sponsors could ask Castro to approve sponsorship of the concert itself since, after all, he had approved an earlier sponsorship. This would be the way that capitalism came to Cuba, my friend said. Understanding capitalism’s agents must be central to what any study of capitalism itself.
I also think a lot of classic social theory is still relevant or can be made to be relevant. I think that many fields in the humanities and softer social sciences have become trendified, picking up and discarding theoretical perspectives so quickly that key insights aren’t given enough space or are overlooked altogether. Or, if one aspect of a particular theorist’s work fades into disuse, we ignore what might still be useful. Geertz is a good example here. He’s been critiqued for a number of things, but his central premise—that people are meaning-seeking begins and that we should focus our studies on what is meaningful to our interlocutors—is still powerful. Theories come and go, meaningfulness does not.