
https://www.dukeupress.edu/hailing-the-state
Ilana Gershon: Why did you decide to call your book, Hailing the State? What becomes available for analysis when you understand protest as amplifying “efforts to communicate with the state” (p. 202) instead of resisting the state?
Lisa Mitchell: The term “hailing” comes from Louis Althusser, who famously wrote about the process through which individuals are interpellated as subjects of ideological state apparatuses. In his discussion, only representatives of the state (he uses a policeman on the street as an example) are seen as agents of the act of “hailing” and, by extension, the act of surveillance. Those on the street are significant only as the objects of the hailing, as passive recipients of the actions carried out by representatives of the state. But what I’ve encountered over and over again in southern India—actually all over India—are people who desperately want to be recognized by the state, want to be interpellated as subjects of the state, but whose efforts to be recognized and interpellated are repeatedly ignored or refused. They are active agents of a wide range of practices of hailing as they engage in surveillance of the state, seek to hold elected officials to their campaign promises and to existing legal provisions, and struggle to amplify their voices and be recognized and heard by various representatives of the state. In this sense, “hailing” does not mean bowing down before someone or something, but rather refers to collective efforts to get the attention of and be heard by someone in a position of authority when earlier individual efforts to be heard have failed.
The book’s argument draws from the experiences of two particular groups in India who have resorted to collective action in public spaces to amplify their voices, demand more equitable enforcement of existing legal structures, and hold elected officials accountable to their campaign promises. The first are Dalits, or those historically regarded as “untouchable” by orthodox Hinduism, who have organized collectively to insist on the enforcement of existing laws in the wake of violent atrocities perpetuated against Dalits. Scholars of the history of Dalit politics like K. Satyanarayana and Parthasarathi Muthukkaruppan have documented the repeated failures of state officials to ensure the prosecutation of upper-caste groups who have carried out brutal mass killings of Dalits, including in the wake of massacres at Kilvenmani in Tamil Nadu in 1968, Belchi in Bihar in 1977, and Karamchedu and Tsunduru in Andhra Pradesh in 1985 and 1991. These scholars have argued that the failures to fairly implement existing legal provisions have mobilized Dalit political organization. The second major source of evidence in the book comes from the movement for the creation of India’s newest state of Telangana, established in 2014 after a long campaign that dramatically intensified from 2009. Notably, three different political parties were voted into office on the basis of their promises to create the new (much smaller) state, but in each case, elected officials reneged on their promise once in office, fueling increasingly widespread collective actions that sought to hold these parties accountable to their campaign promises.
The book argues that people resort to collective assemblies in public spaces when other methods of (individual) communicative action have failed. I’ve been struck by how almost all existing theoretical analyses of collective political assembly frame collective practices only as resistance to or rejections of the state’s sovereignty, or as efforts to overthrow the state—whether Judith Butler’s assertion that bodies massed in public are an attempt “to contest and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy,” (Butler 2011) Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 2005 description of collective strategies to gain recognition and inclusion as “techniques of challenging the sovereignty” of those in power, or Dario Azzellini and Marina Sitrin’s 2014 claim that slogans like “they don’t represent us!” are “a general rejection of the logic of representation.” This isn’t the way that many of my interlocutors in southern India talk about the political practices that they engage in. Instead, they demand that elected officials act to carry out the law equitably and fulfill their campaign promises because they expect officials to represent the voters who elected them.
William Mazzarella has pointed out that collective forms of political assembly tend to be seen as belonging to an “earlier sepia-tinted version of industrial modernity.” Scholars usually regard collective actions as playing a role in transitions to democracy (or as an external force on democracy) rather than as playing an integral or ongoing role within democracy. Instead of approaching the practice of hailing as uni-directional, then, one of the goals of the book is to take a relational approach to the analysis of the state and its representatives. The book recognizes that it is not just state representatives who hail subjects of the state, but that those on the street also engage in practices of hailing (and surveiling) representatives of the state, and that this is an important part of how democracy works in between elections. Far from seeking to escape the state (as scholars such as James Scott and David Graeber have argued happens in other contexts), many of my interlocuters in southern India actively desire to be recognized by state represetantives and incorporated into networks that connect them with the state in enduring ways, whether via government employment, through access to formal legal protections or state welfare programs, or by means of the recognition granted by state issued ID cards or formal land ownership documents.
In illustrating these desires to be interpellated by and more directly connected to the state, I trace the longer genealogies of collective representational practices like sit-ins, hunger strikes, mass outdoor meetings, road and rail blockades, strikes, the encircling of elected officials, processions, political pilgrimages, and human chains that preceded electoral politics. To fully understand the meanings of electoral politics we need to understand the existing sets of representational practices into which elections were introduced and the ways that these sets of practices shaped elections and were in turn reconfigured by them. Not all collective actions are efforts to hail the state—majoritarian collective actions, for example, often see their primary audience as minority groups within which they hope to instill fear rather than state representatives by whom they wish to be recognized. However, collective actions that do seek to gain the attention of the state are not simply demands for exceptions to the law, as Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between political society and civil society might suggest, but rather are very often seeking fair and equal application of existing laws or the implementation of the campaign promises made by elected officials.
Ilana Gershon: You not only argue that certain protests occur only because all other avenues for redress have failed, but also that when faced with these forms of protest, government and corporate officials are learning new ways to respond. Could you talk a little bit about what you think anthropologists should attend to when encountering similar dialectics of strategies in their fieldwork?
Lisa Mitchell: I’m glad you’ve asked your question that way. Part of my goal in writing this book has been to encourage anthropologists to open up our analytic vision and attend not just to what’s fashionable—focusing on governmentality and its expansion, for example—but also to pay attention to the many ways that states refuse to recognize or interpellate those within its vision. This means paying attention not just to those who participate in collective actions but also to the audiences toward which they are addressing themselves and, even more importantly, to the actions of those in power. I’ve written about the long history of associations between anger or other strong emotions and marginalized groups and have advocated for the need to attend not just to the emotions of the marginalized but also to the emotions of those in positions of authority who often seek to represent themselves as rational actors uninfluenced by emotion and who use the strong emotions of others as excuses to not recognize their communicative acts. What does the policeman feel? The university hostel warden or Vice Chancellor? The District Collector? The school board president?
There’s a long history of efforts to silence, derail, discredit, or criminalize forms of collective assembly in India, particularly under British colonialism, but also since independence in 1947 using colonial-era sedition laws that have never been removed. I argue that it’s important to pay close attention to these mechanisms of silencing, discrediting, or selective criminalizing. Gayatri Spivak famously asked whether the subaltern can speak. In this book I explicitly trace the ways that authorities try to prevent the subaltern from being heard, pointing to the limits of our existing theories of deliberative democracy. Rather than arguing that civility and soft, polite speech are preconditions for democracy, I demonstrate through a wide range of historical and contemporary examples that civility—the ability to speak softly and be heard—is instead an effect of political recognition, which ensures that loud speech or collective action becomes unnecessary. Not everyone has the luxury of being able to speak softly and know that they will still be heard.
Ilana Gershon: How has the introduction of different media changed the ways in which protest happens in India?
Lisa Mitchell: There are clear historical shifts in the ways that collective assemblies have been organized in relationship to available media. One of the important contributions of Hailing the State is to approach road and rail networks not simply as forms of transportation but more importantly, as communicative networks—in effect, as forms of media. So the book pays close attention to the ways that enabling and blocking the movement and smooth flows of large numbers of people function as communicative mechanisms to telegraph political messages across great distances, whether via processions or long-distance pilgrimages to a seat of power, road and rail blockades, or ticketless rail travel to political rallies. There’s a reason that rail blockades in India most often target the express train to the nation’s capital in Delhi. The railways are centrally administered, so railway lines are targeted when groups want to send a message to the central government. Bus systems, on the other hand, are state controlled, so they tend to be targeted for state-level issues. And as I discuss in Chapter 7, members of historically marginalized groups whose voices have a long history of not being heard begin to see themselves as having “arrived” politically when the government adds extra carriages or trains to accommodate their ticketless travel to political events.
The expansion of televisual and social media forms have also had profound impacts on the nature and locations of collective forms of assembly. One of the biggest shifts in the south Indian city of Hyderabad—India’s fourth largest and fourth wealthiest city where I’ve done most of my research—has been the establishment in the 1990s of a designated space for collective assembly. In Hyderabad, this is known as Dharna Chowk or demonstration square, but other cities in India have established similar designated spaces, including Jantar Mantar in Delhi, Azad Maidan in Mumbai, and Freedom Park in Bangalore. When first proposed in the 1990s, activists were strongly opposed to the establishment of Dharna Chowk, as it was located a couple of kilometers away from the State Secretariat on a quiet street off the beaten track. Yet with time and with the recognition that television and newspaper outlets offered regular coverage of events held there, people began to embrace the location, so much so that efforts to move it to the outskirts of the city in 2016 were met with strong opposition and residents of other cities like Tirupati have begun to demand their own designated assembly locations.
Even with the advent of social media—which some predicted might lead to the death of collective assemblies in public spaces—it’s become obvious that the massing of bodies in public spaces have remained important as the substance of many social media posts. And because of these shifts in the role of media, we now see political parties—more than ever before—trying hard to get out in front of popular movements to claim leadership, even where they have not previously played a role. Examples from India include gender demonstrations like the women’s wall in Kerala and farmers’ movements, in which political parties have tried to capitalize on momentum generated by others.
Ilana Gershon: In the past, we both have been inspired by a German media theorist, Friedrich Kittler, and I was wondering if you see traces of Kittler’s inspiration in this book as well?
Lisa Mitchell: That is such an important reminder! Although I don’t actually cite Kittler in Hailing the State as I did in my first book on the making of the concept of the mother tongue, I’ve been profoundly influenced by his call to pay close attention to the channels and networks through which societies are able to select, store, and process relevant information or data. As you know, while Foucault focused on the production of discourses, Kittler took this further to focus on the channels through which discourses were able to move and be received. Shifts in technology have enabled new forms of local and long distance communication, but they have also brought about reconfigurations of what counts as presumed proper language versus merely noise. In addition to the ways that railways and roads came to be available as new networks for long-distance communicative action which I mentioned in response to your earlier question, another central focus of the book is on the factors that have determined whose voices are able to be heard in the public sphere.
In this regard, my thinking has been deeply influenced by a longstanding advocate for the creation of Telangana state, Kaloji Narayana Rao (1914-2002), who I interviewed in the 1990s and who I discuss in Chapter 3. I remember him narrating the history of the Spoken Telugu Movement of the early 20th century, a movement that has otherwise been almost exclusively historized as a liberal effort to expand literacy in Telugu by making the written form of language more closely resemble spoken language. At the time of independence, Telugu was the second most widely spoken language in India. And yet, as Kaloji pointed out, advocates of this movement chose a very particular dialect of spoken Telugu drawn from dominant caste groups in the wealthiest districts of the coastal region of Telugu-speaking South India as the spoken language upon which to base the new written language.
Kaloji went on to call the Spoken Telugu Movement the biggest atrocity that has ever been inflicted upon other caste gropus and residents of other regions of Telugu-speaking south India. He illustrated his point by describing a Telugu-language children’s radio program that had run continuously for the previous forty years. Every week the program aired three to five times, during which the voices of twenty to thirty different children would be heard on the air in each episode. And yet, he challenged, despite the fact that at least two to three million children had participated in the radio program overall, the only children whose voices were ever heard were those from the dominant communities of the two coastal districts of the state where what came to be recognized as “standard Telugu” was spoken. The voices of all of the other Telugu-speaking children in the state were, quite literally, not able to be heard on the radio. In Kittler’s terms, their voices did not even constitute data and could therefore not be conveyed through the existing communicative channels. Kaloji’s story also points to the dramatic limits of the deliberative models of democracy that dominate political theory today.
Ilana Gershon: How has writing this book shaped the ways in which you understand contemporary protest these days, especially the pro-Palestinean protests that are sweeping campuses right now? [swept campuses last year?]
Lisa Mitchell: There are clear parallels with other movements both here in the United States and elsewhere in the world in which voices have not been able to be heard or acknowledged, either individually or collectively. The biggest takeaway is that it’s important not just to devote attention to these communicative actions, but also to the other end of the communicative chain—what the late anthropologist Richard Burghart has called “the conditions of listening,” or the larger structures of power that determine whose voices are able to be heard. In other words, we need to attend to whose words register as data, and to the structures and channels that enable and empower refusals to hear. This returns us also to the point I made earlier that the option to speak softly is not available to everyone. Too often scholars focus exclusively on moments of collective, even violent uprising, without attending to the much longer histories of efforts to communicate that have been ignored, silenced, or even criminalized.
Attention to longer temporal histories and to the genealogies of communicative channels and circulation are crucial. This means also following the money, tracing the ownership and control of media channels and outlets, tracking the legal frameworks that regulate (or don’t regulate) these channels, and attending to efforts to subvert and regulate these forms of control. There are two recent historical moments I would point to in the United States as crucial to the reorganization of the discursive networks that shape our current media environment. The first was the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, which had required licensed media broadcasters to devote airtime to the discussion of controversial matters of public interest and to give airtime to contrasting views on these matters. And the second was the 2010 Citizens United supreme court case which overturned existing (bipartisan) restrictions on the political spending of corporations and profitable organizations and newly empowered such entities to engage in unlimited (and untracked) campaign financing and the funding of political media. This has unleashed corporate and dark money and media influences in ways that that amplify the voices of the wealthiest and most powerful. You can draw a direct line from these decision to today, when we have the world’s wealthiest man—one who bought and now controls major media outlets like the social media platform formerly known Twitter—systematically dismantling regulatory systems and abolishing existing structures of political checks and balances. It’s precisely these regulatory systems and structures of political checks and balances that can help prevent marginalized voices from being drowned out, ignored, and silenced.









